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Inclusionary zoning practices include policies that require or incentivize real estate 
developers to include affordable housing units in their market-rate developments. In Austin, this 
is done by a policy mechanism called the density bonus, which offers developers the option to 
include more density than is allowed in the base zoning in exchange for including affordable units 
or paying a fee that will be used toward affordable housing development in other locations. Austin 
has employed density bonus policies since 2003, which have produced 1,665 affordable units and 
have raised over $6.5 million dollars used toward developing or preserving affordable housing in 
the city. They City of Austin plans to expand the use of density bonus programs to produce 
affordable housing in future changes to the land development code. 
This study evaluates the success of Austin’s density bonus programs and how proposed 
density bonus programs may perform. Costs and location of density bonus programs and other 
city-funded affordable housing programs are compared to evaluate the performance of the density 
bonus programs. The analysis finds density bonus units are much cheaper to the city and out-
perform other city-subsidized units in terms of providing affordable housing in areas that do not 
have existing concentrations of poverty or minority populations. In addition, the study analyzes 
how local rents and other regulations affect density bonus unit production and finds the proposed 
density bonus programs are unlikely to be successful without accounting for hyper-local housing 
market trends.  Last, the study offers recommendations for Austin’s density bonus programs based 
on the analyses.  
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
Background 
Inclusionary zoning (IZ) is an affordable housing tool used across the US to mandate or 
incentivize private developers to build affordable housing via zoning codes. Inclusionary zoning, 
also called inclusionary housing, practices and programs vary depending on the legal context of 
cities and states; some cities mandate inclusionary zoning, while some are forced or chose to use 
voluntary practices. Mandatory programs can require a percentage of income restricted units or a 
fee that will go toward the development of affordable housing with all new developments. 
Voluntary programs offer incentives like additional square footage, height, waived fees, or 
loosening parking requirements to encourage developers to produce affordable housing units or 
pay fees. 
 
The state of Texas preempts mandatory inclusionary zoning, thus all programs that aim to 
incentivize the production of affordable housing must be completely voluntary for developers. 
This means developers are only likely to participate in IZ if the programs are financially 
beneficial to them. In Austin, the city uses density bonus programs as a voluntary inclusionary 
zoning practice. Density bonus programs allow developers to build more square footage than is 
allowed in the base zoning in exchange for either housing units that are affordable, or a fee in 
lieu of the affordable units that is used to support affordable housing off site. This extra square 
footage is referred to as the “bonus”. Without the ability to mandate inclusionary zoning, the 
voluntary density bonus approach is an important tool for producing new affordable units in 
Austin; to date, the programs have created 1,665 affordable housing units and raised over $10 
million in fees in lieu that will go toward the production of affordable housing.  
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While the density bonus programs in Austin are one of the limited tools the city has for 
producing affordable units and building revenue used toward affordable housing, the policies are 
not without flaws and often receive criticism from local housing advocates and policymakers. 
There are currently 10 different density bonus programs employed by the City of Austin (COA), 
each applying to a different area of the city, with different requirements and separate processes 
and each with various levels of success. Of the 10 programs, only 6 have produced housing units 
and over half of all of the units have been produced by a single program.  
 
This report offers an objective evaluation of the density bonus programs in Austin. This report 
will address some of the common criticisms and assumptions of the city’s density bonus 
programs and analyze the programs’ success in terms of production and other IZ goals. Last, this 
report offers key take-aways regarding the density bonus programs in Austin to inform a strategy 
for improvements to the programs.  
 
Research Questions 
Research questions addressed in this report include: 
1. How effective are current density bonus programs at meeting local affordable goals, like 
production, geographic dispersion, and income targeting in Austin?  
a. What are the strengths and weaknesses of current programs in meeting city 
affordable housing goals?  
b. What are the costs associated with the program? 
c. How do the current programs align with affordable housing goals in the city? 
 
2. How can the density bonus programs in Austin be improved? 
a. What factors influence the success of density bonus programs, and how should 
they be evaluated? 
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b. In the context of growth, gentrification, and a proposed new land development 
code; what should the city consider when adjusting the density bonus programs? 
c. What lessons can be learned from other cities on defining program requirements, 
collecting data, and strategies for compliance? 
 
Methodology 
To address the research questions, I used a variety of methods in completing this report. These 
include: 
● Literature Review: I completed a review of relevant literature on IZ and density bonus 
programs. The literature included in the report was sourced from both academics and 
practitioners.  
● Data Analysis: I used the City of Austin’s Affordable Housing Inventory to analyze the 
production rates of local affordable housing programs, including the density bonus 
programs. 
● Spatial Analysis: I used ArcGIS to create the maps included in this report. For the maps 
in Chapter VII, I used data underlying the maps in the Uprooted report.  
● Policy Document Review: I reviewed various policy documents outlining affordable 
housing goals and plans for the City of Austin. This included Imagine Austin, the 
Strategic Housing Blueprint and its Implementation Briefing Book, the current zoning 
codes, documents outlining guidelines for current developer incentives, and the proposed 
LDC (fall 2019 draft). 
● Interviews: I interviewed staff from the City of Austin’s Neighborhood Housing and 
Community Development department for insight on the City’s programs, as well as city 
staff from other peer cities to inform potential lessons learned. 
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Chapter II: Inclusionary Zoning Overview 
 
The Affordable Housing Shortage 
Across the United States, cities are struggling to provide adequate housing options affordable to 
low- and moderate-income families. It’s estimated that only 26% of low-to-moderate-income 
families receive some type of federal housing assistance, and with housing price to income ratios 
at peak levels and a decrease of four million affordable rental units (under $800) since 2011, 
cities are increasingly looking for local options to address the housing affordability crisis.1 
 
The shortage in affordable housing options not only hurts families and individuals who are 
unable to find suitable housing, but a wide body of literature shows limited housing options hurt 
the broader economy as well. In an article published in 2019 in the American Economic Journal: 
Macroeconomics, researchers found the worsening housing shortage between 1964 and 2009 
limited US economic growth by 36%. This is because an affordable housing shortage results in a 
“spatial mismatch of labor”; employers who need employees at various levels of income are 
unable to recruit them due to high housing costs.2 Limited affordable housing options have also 
been found to worsen traffic in cities, as lower and moderate income workers cannot afford to 
live close to their employment.3 Additionally, the Urban Institute reports that households with 
higher rent burdens have less income to spend on other items, which stymies economic growth.4  
 
1 The State of the Nation's Housing 2019. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 
2019,https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_State_of_the_Nations_Housing_2019
.pdf. 
2 Hsieh, Chang-Tai, and Enrico Moretti. 2019. "Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation." American 
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 11 (2): 1-39 
3 Millis, Tom, and Madeleine Steel. “Transitcenter.org.” Transitcenter.org (blog), November 14, 2017. 
https://transitcenter.org/in-portland-economic-displacement-may-be-a-driver-of-transit-ridership-loss/. 
4 Hyun Choi, Jung, Laurie Goodman, and Bing Bai. “Urban Wire: Housing and Finance.” Urban Wire: 




With housing affordability concerns on the rise, local governments have increasingly turned to 
their zoning codes as one tool to address affordable housing shortages. Since the early 2000s, 
hundreds of cities have implemented Inclusionary Zoning (IZ) practices (also commonly referred 
to as Inclusionary Housing), in which local governments mandate or incentivize developers to 
build below market rate housing units via the zoning code5. IZ is popular with local governments 
because it does not require a direct subsidy and generally has low implementation costs. Though 
IZ programs vary, in general, IZ programs mandate or incentivize developers to make portions of 
their market-rate housing developments available at lower rents, provide affordable housing at a 
different location, or pay a fee that will go towards affordable housing efforts in the city.  
 
The goal of IZ is to make the housing market more inclusive of lower income households and 
individuals, and the stipulations are outlined in the zoning code, which is why it is referred to as 
Inclusionary Zoning. IZ policies attempt to make housing markets more inclusive by addressing 
four essential issues:  
 
● Ensuring the benefits of economic growth within cities are more evenly distributed across 
income groups;  
● Attempting to create mixed-income communities by allowing for affordable housing in 
higher income areas and combatting past “exclusionary” zoning practices that disallowed 
people of color and/or households with low incomes in areas with social and economic 
advantages; 
● To offset the shortage in affordable housing options, as most new (rental) housing stock 
that is built tends to be luxury level; 
 
5 Williams, Stockton, Ian Carlton, Lorelei Juntunen, Emily Picha, and Mike Wilkerson. “The Economics of 
Inclusionary Development.” Urban Land Institute, 2016. https://uli.org/wp-content/uploads/ULI-
Documents/Economics-of-Inclusionary-Zoning.pdf. 
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● To offset the effects of declining federal housing assistance.6 
 
Types of Inclusionary Zoning 
IZ protocols vary between municipalities and states, as the legal context around planning and 
zoning also widely varies, as does the need for affordable housing in different cities. The primary 
difference between IZ policies is the distinction as to whether they are mandatory or voluntary. 
Most states allow cities to mandate that developers participate in their IZ policies, meaning the 
city can simply demand the developer dedicate a percentage of their housing to below market-
rents, or (in some cases) choose to pay a fee in lieu. Voluntary programs are those in which the 
developer is not mandated to participate but is given incentives, like fee waivers, or is allowed to 
add additional floor area beyond what is normally allowed.  In a few states, cities are not allowed 
to implement mandatory IZ policies, and thus must rely on developer incentives. It is not 
uncommon for cities who are allowed to use mandatory programs to also offer voluntary 
programs in addition to their mandates to increase participation.  
 
No two cities have identical IZ policies, even within the same state, as IZ policies are typically 
adopted at the local level to address housing needs specific to the municipality.7 Aside from the 
distinction of voluntary or mandatory, cities must decide how to best use IZ tools to address their 
specific housing needs. IZ policies usually include some combination of the following: 
 
 
6 Inclusionary Housing. “Problems Addressed by Inclusionary Housing Programs.” Inclusionary Housing. 
Inclusionary Housing, September 8, 2017. https://inclusionaryhousing.org/inclusionary-housing-
explained/what-problems-does-iz-address/. 
7 Inclusionary Housing. “How Does Inclusionary Housing Work?” Inclusionary Housing. Inclusionary 




Commonly includes allowing additional density (density bonus), fee waivers, loosened 
regulations (like parking requirements), tax abatements, subsidies, zoning variances, and 
expedited development review. 
 
Fees 
Some IZ programs are fee-based, meaning they implement an impact or linkage fee 
instead of, or in combination with, mandating or incentivizing physical development.  
 
Requirements 
Requirements of the IZ policy commonly include the amount of affordable units required 
(usually a percentage or overall or bonus units), the income-levels the units will be 
available for, the amount of time the units must remain affordable, and the quality and 
size of the units that will be affordable. 
 
Alternatives 
IZ policies commonly include alternatives to physically producing affordable housing 
units to maximize the effectiveness of the policy. The most common alternatives include 
allowing development of affordable housing units to happen at another location, paying a 
fee in lieu of development that will go towards an affordable housing fund, or dedicating 
land for affordable housing development.8 
 
 
8 Inclusionary Housing. “Designing a Policy.” Inclusionary Housing. Inclusionary Housing, February 9, 
2018. https://inclusionaryhousing.org/designing-a-policy/. 
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Inclusionary Zoning in Austin, TX 
In Texas, mandatory IZ policies are preempted by the state, so all IZ practices must be entirely 
voluntary. In Austin, IZ is done entirely through developer incentives; mostly through the 
density bonus. The density bonus mentioned above under Incentives is a common means of 
incentivizing developers to include below-market units in their market rate housing 
developments. The density bonus allows for additional floor area or height beyond that allowed 
under the relevant zoning criteria in exchange for a set aside of affordable units or a fee. The way 





Chapter III Literature Review of Inclusionary Zoning Policies  
With its flexibility and the relative ease of adoption, IZ has surged in popularity in large, small, 
and suburban cities across the US. To date, around 800 jurisdictions have adopted some form of 
an IZ policy.9 However, despite its popularity and seeming success, IZ policies have garnered 
much criticism over their legality, effectiveness, and remain highly controversial.  The literature 
review outlined below outlines some of the common arguments for and against IZ as well as 
attempts to analyze its effectiveness. 
 
With the vast increase in IZ policies over the past 20 years, attempts to analyze the effectiveness 
of IZ in generating affordable housing developments have also increased. However, researchers 
have a hard time making data-based statements about the effectiveness of IZ overall as the 
policies and economic context the policies exist in vary so greatly between cities. In addition, 
researchers note it is difficult to obtain accurate counts of IZ units and monetary contributions, as 
many jurisdictions do not keep detailed lists of IZ units and fees. In 2017, the Lincoln Land 
Institute produced the largest inventory of IZ programs that exists to date. This study found that 
of the 791 known jurisdictions with an IZ policy, 76% of them have produced an estimated 
173,707 units and raised $1.7 billion in fees.10 The researchers point out the limitations in data 
collection and how this should be remedied to further an understanding of how effective IZ is 
working as a tool to develop affordable housing. In Producing Affordable Housing in Rising 
Markets: What Works? Lance Freeman and Jenny Schuetz point out it is hard to find and use 
 
9 Thaden, Emily, and Ruoniu Wang. “Inclusionary Housing in the United States: Prevalence, Impact, and 
Practices.” Lincoln Land Institute of Land Policy, September 2017. 
https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/thaden_wp17et1_0.pdf. 
10 Thaden, Emily, and Ruoniu Wang. “Inclusionary Housing in the United States: Prevalence, Impact, and 
Practices.” Lincoln Land Institute of Land Policy, September 2017. 
https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/thaden_wp17et1_0.pdf. 
10 
“apples to apples” comparisons in analyzing IZ policies, since housing markets and program 
design greatly vary.11 
 
Though analyzing exact counts of IZ production is difficult given many localities do not keep 
detailed records of IZ units, it appears as though IZ tends to produce only a modest number of 
affordable units in local markets, when compared to other local and federal programs that aim 
to increase affordable housing development. In Producing Affordable Housing in Rising 
Markets: What Works? Lance Freeman and Jenny Schuetz compare IZ production in five US 
regions to units produced through the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) in the same 
area. The researchers found the annual average production of IZ programs pales in comparison to 
LIHTC production.12 However, many authors argue that even though IZ may produce modest 
counts of units, it is one tool in a “toolbox” of policies cities can use to create an 
environment friendly to affordable housing development.13  
  
A common criticism of IZ policies, and part of why they are so controversial, is their economic 
spillover effects. Many argue the economics of IZ actually can increase housing prices overall 
and slow the production of housing, which is antithetical to its goals. The economic logic behind 
these arguments is  that when developers take on the costs of below-market units or 
impact/linkage fees, it will result in either the developer pushing those costs onto consumers by 
raising prices for market-rate housing, or production will slow since it is more costly.14 
Grounded Solutions Network published a literature review of 22 peer-reviewed articles that 
 
11 Freeman, Lance, and Jenny Schuetz. “Producing Affordable Housing in Rising Markets: What Works?” 
Penn IUR, September 2016. https://penniur.upenn.edu/uploads/media/Freeman-Schuetz_PennIUR-
Philly_Fed_working_paper_091616v2.pdf. 
12 Freeman, Lance, and Jenny Schuetz. “Producing Affordable Housing in Rising Markets: What Works?” 
Penn IUR, September 2016. https://penniur.upenn.edu/uploads/media/Freeman-Schuetz_PennIUR-
Philly_Fed_working_paper_091616v2.pdf. 
13 Thaden, Emily, and Ruoniu Wang. “Inclusionary Housing in the United States: Prevalence, Impact, and 
Practices.” Lincoln Land Institute of Land Policy, September 2017. 
https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/thaden_wp17et1_0.pdf. 




evaluated the effects of IZ policies on housing production and prices. This literature review 
found that in some areas, prices did indeed rise and production did slow down, however there 
were several areas that did not see these spillover effects.15 The research found overall that while 
in some cities there was a correlation between IZ policies and housing prices, the conditions of 
the market largely determine whether or not the spillover effects occur. They also concluded 
that in very tight housing markets, IZ policies can actually increase housing production.16  
 
The literature around evaluating IZ policies generally agrees that the effectiveness of an IZ 
policy is largely determined by program design. In the Urban Land Institute report, 
Understanding the Economics of Inclusionary Development and in the National Housing 
Conference brief, What Makes Inclusionary Zoning Happen? researchers outline not only the 
importance of program design, but also the importance of understanding your local market to 
design an IZ policy that works well. The report explains that IZ can only work when market-rate 
production is already happening, and the local zoning codes will determine whether or not a 
developer can build a profitable project. The researchers provide the following graphic to help 
explain the economics of how IZ production works. 17 
 
 
15  “Economics of Inclusionary Housing and Impact Fees: A Literature Review.” Grounded Solutions 
Network, April 2018. http://inclusionaryhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/07-economics-of-
inclusionary-housing-policies-and-impact-fees-literature-review.pdf 
16 “The Economics of Inclusionary Housing Policies: Effects on Housing Production.” Grounded Solutions 
Network, http://inclusionaryhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Economics-of-Inclusionary-Housing-
Policies-Effects-on-Housing-Production_a.pdf 
17 Williams, Stockton, Ian Carlton, Lorelei Juntunen, Emily Picha, and Mike Wilkerson. “The Economics 
of Inclusionary Development.” Urban Land Institute, 2016. https://uli.org/wp-content/uploads/ULI-
Documents/Economics-of-Inclusionary-Zoning.pdf. 
12 




In sum, the literature around IZ policies generally points to the importance of evaluating IZ 
policies at a local level. The literature shows that while critiques of the economic effects of IZ 
are valid, the positive or negative economic effects of such policies are really determined by how 
housing markets operate at the local level. The research also shows that while some may argue 
the housing production resulting from IZ may be modest compared to other housing production 
mechanisms, it is still an important tool local government can use to address the housing 
shortage. Last, the literature around IZ also makes the important distinction that IZ is most 
effective when there is a strong demand for housing; it does not work well in weaker markets.  
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Chapter IV: State of Affordable Housing in Austin 
 
To understand the effectiveness of the density bonus in Austin, Texas, it is imperative to first 
understand the broader environment of housing and affordable housing needs in the city. This 
chapter provides an overview of affordability in Austin, existing plans related to affordable 
housing, other city programs related to producing affordable housing, and an overview of the 
land code rewrite currently in progress.  
 
Affordability in Austin 
Like many growing US cities, housing prices in Austin have increased disproportionately with 
income since the 1990s. In more recent decades, Austin has experienced steady population 
growth. Between 2010-2018, Austin’s population grew by more than 30%, putting it as one of 
the top destinations for “migrating talent”. With the boom in population, prices in Austin’s 
housing market continues to increase, leading to increasing gentrification and displacement 
concerns. During this same period, the median price to buy a single-family home increased by 
71%, while the median family income for a four-person household increased by only 38%. In 
2019, Housing Works estimated that 36% of Austin’s households are cost burdened, meaning 
they spend 30% or more of their income on housing costs alone. Currently, about 54% of Austin 
residents are renters, while about 45% are homeowners. 
 
Existing Plans 
To address affordability issues, the City and housing advocates have undertaken several planning 
efforts and produced reports and plans. This section outlines those plans related to creating 




Adopted in 2012, Imagine Austin is the city’s 30-year comprehensive plan. Imagine Austin 
references housing affordability concerns throughout and lists “housing and neighborhoods” as 
one of 7 “building blocks to a complete community”. The plan outlines several policies related to 
increasing and diversifying the supply of housing across the city, as well as increasing the supply 
of affordable housing. The density bonus is specifically mentioned in Imagine Austin, but only as 
a tool for use in redeveloping brownfield sites. Since Imagine Austin was adopted, the City had 
adopted specific housing goals (outlined below) and aimed to implement many of the priorities 
listed in Imagine Austin through a revision of the land development code (LDC). Through these 
efforts, the goals for density bonus programs have been broadly expanded beyond brownfield 
redevelopment.  
 
Austin Strategic Housing Blueprint 
After the adoption of Imagine Austin, the city went through the planning process for a plan 
specific to housing goals, and the first Austin Strategic Housing Blueprint (the Blueprint) was 
adopted in 2017. The Blueprint outlines an ambitious goal of creating 135,000 housing units in 
the city between 2017-2027. Of the 135,000 units, the plan states 60,000 should be affordable to 
households at 80% median family income (MFI) and below. The Blueprint also identifies the 
density bonus as a key mechanism for creating units for households with incomes between 30%-
80% of MFI. Other mechanisms listed to help create these units include federal and local 
funding; a strike fund, which would provide flexible funding to preserve affordable housing from 
public and private investment, and “other incentives”. The Blueprint also calls for the City to 
implement IZ as allowable under Texas law, and sets the goal of the density bonus program to 
create 1,450 affordable units within the 10-year timeline. The plan also aims to create 47,716 
affordable units through “other tools”, which among a wide variety of housing production 
techniques, includes the expansion of density bonus programs. 
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In late 2017, the City Council directed the Neighborhood Housing and Community Development 
(NHCD) department to create an implementation plan for the Blueprint. In 2018, the Blueprint 
Implementation Plan and complementary Atlas of Existing and Historical Conditions documents 
were published. The purpose of these documents was to provide a detailed work plan for 
implementing the goals outlined in the Blueprint. Soon after the first version of the Blueprint 
Implementation Plan was published, and as displacement and gentrification concerns in the city 
continued to rise, several reports and policy documents were published outlining strategies for 
mitigating the effects of residential displacement. With the immediate threat of residential 
displacement in mind, NHCD revised the Blueprint Implementation Plan to include short-term 
strategies to mitigate displacement. Released in early 2019, the latest version is titled the 
Blueprint Implementation Plan Briefing Book (Briefing Book). Throughout the Briefing Book, 
the density bonus is referenced under several of the actions called for. Specifically, the Briefing 
Book calls for the density bonus program to expand under the new land development code to new 
areas, and to create larger units with 2-3 bedrooms, and aims to increase consistency of program 
design across the programs. 
 
Austin Strategic Direction 2023 
In 2017, after the City Council electoral process moved to the 10-1 geographical representation 
system, the City Manager conducted research to identify key issues within the city as an 
organization and put forward priorities for the City Council to achieve in a three-five-year 
timeline. As a result, in 2018, the City Council adopted the Austin Strategic Direction 2023 
(SD23). SD23 outlines six “priority outcomes” for the city to work towards and track until 2023; 
the first of which is “Economic Opportunity and Affordability”. The plan also states that 
“affordability” should be addressed in each of the six outcomes. Regarding expanding affordable 
housing, SD23 calls to implement the “highest impact” strategies outlined in the Blueprint 
Implementation Plan Briefing Book, and to ensure affordability is addressed in the rewrite of the 
land development code. While SD23 prioritizes and recognizes the importance of affordable 
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housing, it does not outline specific mechanisms for doing so, nor does it mention the density 
bonus. 
 
Uprooted Gentrification Study 
In 2017, as concerns over gentrification and displacement throughout the city continued to rise, 
the City Council passed a resolution to fund a comprehensive study of gentrification and 
displacement in the city. Researchers from the University of Texas at Austin were contracted to 
produce the report, titled Uprooted: Residential Displacement in Austin’s Gentrifying 
Neighborhoods and What Can Be Done About It (Uprooted) which was published in 2018. 
Uprooted analyzed the level of vulnerability to gentrification of census tracts in Austin and 
documented where gentrification is already happening. The report produced a series of maps city 
staff and other researchers can use to track the gentrification process and to design policies to 
address it. Additionally, Uprooted outlined several case studies from other cities where policies 
to mitigate displacement due to gentrification have been successful, as well as a list of policies 
that may be appropriate for Austin. The report also emphasizes the importance of developing 
strategies that are place-based, and specific to the context of the neighborhood. Uprooted lists 
expanding and modifying Austin’s current density bonus programs as a possible tool for 
expanding affordable housing in the city and reducing the negative effects of gentrification.  
 
Local Programs to Produce Affordable Housing 
The City of Austin currently has a number of programs and policies to expand affordable 
housing options. This section provides a high-level summary of those programs. It is important 
to note that this report, and specifically this section, focuses on local mechanisms to produce 
affordable housing; a detailed description of federal programs and non-profit programs is beyond 
the scope of this report. This analysis only includes mechanisms to physically produce housing 
units, it does not include city programs to provide direct assistance to renters or homebuyers 




The City of Austin NHCD offers 13 types of developer incentives; 12 of which are density 
bonuses. The SMART Housing programs offer developers a combination of fee waivers and 
other development incentives. In addition to these programs, the city also offers case-by-case 
developer agreements to incentivize the production of affordable housing. Additionally, in 2018 
a new density bonus program titled Affordability Unlocked was adopted, however details of that 
program are not included in this report as it is new and there is no data to report yet. Affordability 
Unlocked offers multiple incentives including a density bonus and waived fees in exchange for 
50% or more affordable units, which is specifically useful for developers already building 
affordable housing. The following table displays the city’s developer incentive programs (except 
for Affordability Unlocked). 
18 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































From September 2005 to March 2020, the developer incentives programs in the City of Austin 
have created over 6,000 housing units affordable to families at or below 100% MFI. Currently, 
there are 4,733 affordable units remaining in the market that were created through developer 
incentives; the bulk of which are affordable for households at or below 60% MFI. The required 
affordability period ranges for each program, but generally 40 years of affordability is required 
for rental properties and 99 years for ownership properties. Additionally, there are another 2,790 
units in the pipeline (ranging from site plan approval to building permit approval), putting the 
total current, expired, and upcoming developer incentivized units at about 9,000 since 2004. 
Additionally, the developer incentive programs have raised over $10.5 million in fees that go 
toward affordable housing development, with nearly $20 million expected for developments 
currently in the pipeline. As of May 2018, the Housing Trust Fund, which includes the density 
bonus fees in lieu, had produced 1,430 affordable units. The tables below provide a breakdown 
of developer incentivized units at MFI levels and the fees in lieu, which go toward the Housing 














Table 2 City of Austin Developer Incentive Units Currently In-Market 
City of Austin Developer Incentive Units Currently in 
Market 
Sum of Units <= 30% MFI 0 
Sum of Units <= 40% MFI 0 
Sum of Units <= 50% MFI 151 
Sum of Units <= 60% MFI 3327 
Sum of Units <= 65% MFI 42 
Sum of Units <= 80% MFI 1163 
Sum of Units <= 100% MFI 11 





Table 3 City of Austin Developer Incentive Units Expired 
City of Austin Developer Incentive 
Units Expired  
Sum of Units <= 30% MFI 0 
Sum of Units <= 40% MFI 0 
Sum of Units <= 50% MFI 0 
Sum of Units <= 60% MFI 244 
Sum of Units <= 65% MFI 0 
Sum of Units <= 80% MFI 1430 
Sum of Units <= 100% MFI 0 






Table 4 City of Austin Developer Incentive Units In Pipeline 
City of Austin Developer Incentive Units In Pipeline 
Sum of Units <= 30% MFI 66 
Sum of Units <= 40% MFI 36 
Sum of Units <= 50% MFI 363 
Sum of Units <= 60% MFI 1953 
Sum of Units <= 65% MFI 2 
Sum of Units <= 80% MFI 368 
Sum of Units <= 100% MFI 4 









Table 5 City of Austin Total Developer Incentive Units: Currently in Market and in Pipeline 
City of Austin Developer Incentive Units: Current and in Pipeline   
Sum of Units <= 30% MFI 66 
Sum of Units <= 40% MFI 36 
Sum of Units <= 50% MFI 514 
Sum of Units <= 60% MFI 5280 
Sum of Units <= 65% MFI 44 
Sum of Units <= 80% MFI 1531 
Sum of Units <= 100% MFI 15 
Sum of Total Affordable Units 7523 
 
 
Table 6 Developer Incentive Fees in Lieu 









Housing Development Assistance 
In addition to offering developer incentives, the City of Austin also provides financial assistance 
to produce affordable housing units through the Austin Housing Finance Corporation (AHFC). 
The AHFC is a public non-profit, overseen by the Austin City Council, that has the ability to 
leverage local and federal funds to finance housing for low-to-moderate households.  Housing 
development assistance from the AHFC is granted under two programs: Rental Housing 
Development Assistance (RHDA) and Ownership Housing Development Assistance (OHDA). 
RHDA and OHDA leverage local and federal funds to grant a variety of loan types to developers 
in exchange for affordable set-asides and requirements.  Funds the AHFC uses include: 
 
 
• Federal funds from the CDBG and HOME grant funds 
• Private Activity Bonds (PABs) 
• General Obligation Bonds 
• City of Austin Housing Trust Fund 
 
Since 1993, over 8,000 affordable units have been supported through these programs. It is also 
important to note that while these 8,000 units have been supported by development assistance, 
the city subsidies usually do not cover the complete cost of producing an income restricted unit. 
Many of these units also receive funding from other sources, including the Low-Income Tax 
Credit (LIHTC). Currently, there are 7,388 affordable units in the market created through these 
programs, with an additional 398 in the pipeline. As the AHFC provides direct financial 
assistance and subsidies, these units are generally able to reach deeper affordability than those in 
the developer incentive programs, though they come at a higher price. The tables below outline 




Table 7 AHFC-Subsidized Units Currently in Market 
City of Austin Housing AHFC-Subsidized units  
Sum of Units <= 30% MFI 409 
Sum of Units <= 40% MFI 60 
Sum of Units <= 50% MFI 2870 
Sum of Units <= 60% MFI 2779 
Sum of Units <= 65% MFI 0 
Sum of Units <= 80% MFI 1210 
Sum of Units <= 100% MFI 0 
Sum of Total Affordable Units 7388 
 
 
Table 8 AHFC-Subsidized Units Expired 
City of Austin Housing Assistance Units Expired 
Sum of Units <= 30% MFI 0 
Sum of Units <= 40% MFI 0 
Sum of Units <= 50% MFI 42 
Sum of Units <= 60% MFI 285 
Sum of Units <= 65% MFI 0 
Sum of Units <= 80% MFI 334 
Sum of Units <= 100% MFI 0 




Table 9 AHFC-Subsidized Units in Pipeline 
City of Austin Housing Assistance Units in Pipeline 
Sum of Units <= 30% MFI 42 
Sum of Units <= 40% MFI 27 
Sum of Units <= 50% MFI 189 
Sum of Units <= 60% MFI 94 
Sum of Units <= 65% MFI 0 
Sum of Units <= 80% MFI 46 
Sum of Units <= 100% MFI 0 




Table 10 City of Austin Housing AHFC-Subsidized units: Current and in Pipeline 
City of Austin Housing Assistance Units: Current and in Pipeline   
Sum of Units <= 30% MFI 451 
Sum of Units <= 40% MFI 87 
Sum of Units <= 50% MFI 3059 
Sum of Units <= 60% MFI 2873 
Sum of Units <= 65% MFI 0 
Sum of Units <= 80% MFI 1256 
Sum of Units <= 100% MFI 0 
Sum of Total Affordable Units 7786 
 
Land Development Code Rewrite 
In addition to the city’s policies and programs to produce affordable housing, the city began a 
process to rewrite the land development code over six years ago. The current land development 
code was written over 30 years ago, which makes keeping housing production up to the level of 
demand especially difficult, as the current code is described as overly complicated and is charged 
with slowing housing production. With an updated code, policymakers hope to increase density 
and housing production, in hopes of making Austin more affordable in general. The estimated 
housing capacity under the current code (as of March 2020) is 145,000 housing units. As of 
February 2020, city staff and consultants estimate an increase to a housing capacity range of 
146,528 (lowest estimate) to 195,528 housing units (highest estimate). 
 
The Fall 2019 draft LDC also proposes expanding the use of density bonus programs. The [fall 
2019 draft] code proposes changes to three existing density bonus programs, the Downtown 
Density Bonus, the VMU program, and the UNO program by expanding them and increasing the 
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affordable set aside requirement, and also proposes a few new density bonus programs, which 
are discussed in detail later in this report. With the proposed changes to the land code, city staff 
estimates the affordable housing bonus capacity could increase from its current level (1,665 
units) to a range between 6,607 to 16,238 units. A more detailed discussion of how the land code 
changes could impact density bonus performance is included in Chapter VIII of this report.  
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Chapter V: Austin Density Bonus Programs 
 
As stated earlier in this report, of the 13 developer incentive programs in the City of Austin, 12 
offer a density bonus. Each of the density bonus programs has different requirements and offers 
different incentives; current density bonus programs are available in 3% of the City. The details 
of each program are described in Figure 1 (also included as Appendix A) of this report. To 
participate in a density bonus program, developers agree to meet the requirements of the 
programs, all of which require setting aside a portion of the total units to be income restricted. 
Once the developer agrees to participate in the program and receive the incentive, they enter into 
a contract (or a restrictive covenant is placed on the program) outlining the length of 
affordability requirements. This chapter will analyze housing production and fees in lieu raised 
by each program and provide geographic context by mapping each program. Data from the 
Austin Affordable Housing Inventory as of March 8, 2020 was used for all analysis in this 
chapter.  
 
Unit and Fee in Lieu Production: All density bonus programs 
Of the 4,733 developer incentivized housing units currently in the market in Austin, TX, 1,665 of 
those were the result of a density bonus program. The bulk of these units are rental housing 
available to households at or below 60% and 80% MFI. Additionally, there are another 1,107 
affordable units in the pipeline (status ranging from site plan approved to building permit 
issued). The tables below provide a break-down of these units by tenure and income categories. 
The density bonus units are mostly located in Central and East Austin; there are no density bonus 
programs or units located west of Mo-Pac.  Additionally, the density bonus programs to date 
have raised $6,587,005 in fee in lieu payments, with an additional calculated sum total of 
$21,757,323 in potential fees in lieu from pending projects. The fee in lieu payments go into 
Austin’s Housing Trust Fund, which support the rehabilitation and development of affordable 






















Ownership 60 0 0 0 0 0 49 11 
Rental 1626 0 0 141 738 0 708 0 
Total 1686 0 0 141 738 0 757 11 
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Figure 2 Density Bonus Projects Currently in the Market 
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Figure 3 Upcoming Density Bonus Projects 
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Unit and Fee in Lieu Production: Individual Density Bonus Programs 
Unit and Fee in Lieu Production: Downtown Density Bonus (DDB) 
The Downtown Density Bonus policy was adopted in 2013 to achieve community benefits 
including affordable housing units or fees for affordable housing when high density buildings 
were built in downtown Austin. To date, it has resulted in zero affordable units produced, but has 
raised $1,355,375 in fees in lieu, which goes into the Housing Trust Fund which supports 
developing affordable housing in the city. 
 
Unit and Fee in Lieu Production: East Riverside Corridor (ERC) 
The ERC bonus policy was also adopted in 2013 to encourage affordable housing development 
along the East Riverside area, which is known to be rapidly gentrifying. To date, the ERC bonus 
has not produced any affordable units or fees in lieu. The lack of production could denote an 
uneven balance between density bonus requirements and incentives or could imply the density 
bonus is not of particular advantage to developers in this area.  
 
Unit and Fee in Lieu Production: Micro Unit Density Bonus 
The Micro Unit Density Bonus was adopted in 2014 and applies to multifamily use in Transit 
Oriented Development Districts or along Core Transit Corridors when units are 500 square feet 
or less. To date, the Micro Unit Density Bonus has not produced any affordable units or fees in 
lieu. Again, this lack of production could represent an uneven balance between developer 
requirements and incentives or could represent the low development levels of units this small. 
 
Unit and Fee in Lieu Production: North Burnet Gateway (NBG) Development Bonus 
The NBG Development Bonus was adopted in 2009 as part of the NBG Regulating Plan, which 
aimed to implement the district’s Master Plan and increase density and mixed-use development 
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in the North Burnet corridor. To date, the NBG Development Bonus has produced 39 affordable 
rental units and raised $827,308 in fees in lieu payments. The units are located along N. Burnet 
and West Breaker Lane. The North Burnet neighborhood has become particularly popular with 
young professionals, due to its proximity to the Domain, a high-density mixed-use development 
and due to easy access to downtown. North Burnet is largely comprised of newer, luxury condos 
and apartments.  
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Unit and Fee in Lieu Production: Planned Unit Development (PUD) Bonus 
The PUD Development Bonus was adopted in 2008 to incentivize those looking for Planned Unit 
Development district zoning approval to include a set aside for affordable housing units. To date, 
PUD has not produced any development bonus units or fees in lieu. 
 
Unit and Fee in Lieu Production: Rainey St. Density Bonus  
The Rainey St. Density Bonus was adopted in 2005 with plans to redevelop the area and was last 
updated in 2014 to better incentivize affordable housing development in the Rainey St. 
Subdistrict. The Rainey St. program is actually a sub-district of the Downtown Density Bonus 
Program. To date, the Raney St. Density Bonus has produced 16 affordable rental housing units. 
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Unit and Fee in Lieu Production: S.M.A.R.T. Housing Greenfield Density Bonus (Single-Family 
and Multi-Family) 
The S.M.A.R.T. Housing Greenfield Density Bonus was adopted in 2008 to further incentivize 
development partaking in the city’s S.M.A.R.T. housing programs to produce affordable housing 
units. To date, this bonus has produced 11 affordable rental housing units. The units are located 
in South Austin near W. Oltorf and Thornton Road 
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Unit and Fee in Lieu Production: Transit Oriented Development (TOD) Development Bonus 
The TOD Development Bonus was adopted in 2009 and applies to Transit Oriented 
Development Districts located at Plaza Saltillo, Crestview, and MLK. To date, the TOD 
Development Bonus has produced 13 affordable ownership units, 190 affordable rental units, and 
raised $1,202,079 in fees in lieu, which go to the Housing Trust Fund to support the development 
of affordable housing in the city.  
 
Unit and Fee in Lieu Production: University Neighborhood Overlay (UNO) Density Bonus (pre 
and post 2014) 
The UNO Density Bonus was adopted in 2004 to incentivize affordable housing production in 
areas near the University of Texas at Austin’s campus. The UNO Density Bonus was updated in 
2014 to deepen affordability levels and extend affordability periods. To date, the UNO Density 
Bonus has produced one affordable ownership unit, 879 affordable rental units, and raised 
$3,202,243 in fees in lieu.  
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Unit and Fee in Lieu Production: Vertical Mixed Use (VMU) 
VMU was adopted in 2010 to incentivize affordable housing development in developments 
falling in a vertical mixed-use overlay, which is a zoning designation to encourage mixed uses 
like commercial and residential within the same building. To date, the VMU bonus has produced 
25 affordable ownership units and 491 affordable rental units. 
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As outlined in the table below, of the ten separate density bonus programs, four have not 
produced any affordable units. The Downtown Density Bonus has not produced any units but has 
raised over $1.3 million in fees in lieu. The UNO Density Bonus is responsible for over half of 
all housing production of all density bonus programs but may be targeted mostly toward students 
given the proximity to the University of Texas at Austin. Ownership units account for only about 
2% of all housing units produced by density bonus programs. Generally, the density bonus 
projects are well distributed geographically throughout Austin, with the majority of units near 
UT’s campus as part of the UNO bonus. As the VMU program is available in a fairly large 
geography, it has produced units in a more geographically dispersed range than other density 












Units Fees in Lieu 
Downtown  0 0 $1,355,375.00 
ERC 0 0 $0.00 
Micro Unit  0 0 $0.00 
NBG 0 39 $827,308.00 
PUD 0 0 $0.00 
Rainey St. 0 16 $0.00 
S.M.A.R.T. Greenfield 0 11 $0.00 
TOD 13 190 $1,202,079.00 
UNO 1 879 $3,202,243.00 
VMU 25 491 $0.00 




Chapter VI: Common Criticisms of Austin’s Density Bonus Programs  
 
As mentioned in the literature review included in this report, inclusionary zoning practices are 
highly debated and controversial. The density bonus programs in Austin are no exception to this, 
and while some have produced affordable housing units and raised millions in fees in lieu, some 
local housing advocates, policymakers and community members remain skeptical of the value of 
these programs. NHCD staff are not unaware of issues around the density bonus programs and 
have formally acknowledged many of them and provided recommendations to improve the 
programs in a memorandum provided to the Austin City Council in 2019. This section outlines 
and addresses some of the most common criticisms of Austin’s density bonus programs; several 
of these issues were identified by NHCD staff.  
 
Data collection and management 
Questions have been raised around who exactly is living in the density bonus units and whether 
or not these programs are helping address the city’s affordable housing goals in terms of 
vulnerable populations, as currently the city is not collecting any demographic data on density 
bonus residents, nor do they collect a copy of the lease application or lease agreement. The city 
requires participating properties to keep a copy of a form that certifies income and household 
size of the residents, as well as proof of income, but there are no employment or demographic 
questions on those forms. Demographic information would help the city better understand which 
populations are accessing these units, and if there are any gaps in access.  Employment data 
would help the city better understand who lives in density bonus programs, and where these 
types of units are needed in relation to transit, employment, and schools. Concerns around fair 
housing laws and collecting demographic data have been raised, as landlords are not allowed to 
collect demographic data at the time of lease. However, the City collects this type of 
demographic information on residents in developments that have received city subsidies 
(development assistance). If the data were collected after the units have been leased, fair housing 
violations should not be an issue. While the City should consult its legal experts, it does not seem 
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the Fair Housing concerns are warranted given the same data is collected for other units. Having 
this data would also allow the City to assess if there are fair housing concerns within the density 
bonus programs, as it would show if protected classes are able to access these programs or not.  
 
In addition to the narrowness of the information currently collected on DB residents, there is also 
not a streamlined method for collecting data and forms from developers and property managers 
on an ongoing basis. Though they’ve expressed desire for it, NHCD lacks an online portal where 
participants in the density bonus can submit all of their forms in one place. An online tool could 
help the City reduce staff time to implement the density bonus programs and offer an avenue for 
both data collection and management.  
 
Compliance and enforcement 
Some housing advocates and local policymakers have raised concerns over the city’s inability to 
meaningfully track ongoing compliance with density bonus affordability requirements and 
enforce repercussions of noncompliance. An important distinction in this discussion is that 
concerns are over ongoing compliance rather than compliance during the construction phase. 
When developers opt to participate in a density bonus, they must prove the affordable units will 
be included in construction in order to receive their building permits; this process is not of 
concern as it is easy to enforce. The compliance concerns are related to ongoing compliance as to 
who the affordable units are being leased to over the long-term. 
 
To monitor ongoing compliance of density bonus units, the city uses a contracted third party and 
properties are monitored every three years. Many argue that every three years is not enough to 
meaningfully catch non-compliance and worry that the properties are not adhering to 
affordability requirements for the units. In a recent monitoring effort, a 10% sample of all 
density bonus units was monitored, and the majority of units were found to be out of compliance. 
However, the most common violation was a lack of the documentation that participants are 
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required to keep on file, such as proof of income for each year; they were not necessarily large 
infractions. In other words, the non-compliance did not necessarily show that residents are not 
meeting the income requirements. In addition, the city has limited means of enforcement if a 
participant is out of compliance. A recent change requires participating properties to sign a 
contract agreeing to abide by the terms of affordability for the given affordability period; 
previously a restrictive covenant would be placed on the property, rather than a contract. Though 
a contract can provide a more legally defensible means for enforcement, the enforcement process 
is still extremely costly and labor intensive. If a property is found out of compliance, the City can 
take the non-complying property to court and enforce fees on the property or disallow them from 
participating in city sponsored programs. The City is also currently exploring further means of 
enforcement. Enforcing non-compliance of a density bonus unit, that costs the city a relatively 
low amount, would require a great cost burden on the city as they would take on court and legal 
fees.  
 
Affordability levels and set-aside requirements 
As outlined earlier in this report, the bulk of density bonus units are available to households at or 
below 80% MFI (for homeowner units) and 60% MFI (for rental units). In fact, 45% of all 
density bonus units are available for households at 80% or below MFI and 44% are available for 
households at or below 60% MFI, 8% of density bonus units are affordable to households at or 
below 50% MFI, and there are no density bonus units available to households below 40% MFI. 
Some local housing advocates point this out as problematic, arguing the housing most needed is 
50% MFI and below. However, the density bonus programs are inherently limited in what 
affordability levels they can reach as the cost to developers must be low enough to incentivize 
them to voluntarily participate. There is no monetary subsidy provided with the density bonus, so 
the bonus must outweigh the costs of the below-market rate units.  
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Low production of units for homeownership 
As noted previously, ownership units created through density bonus programs in Austin account 
for only about 2% (39 total) of all density bonus production. Additionally, 26 of the 29 density 
bonus ownership units belong to the TOD and VMU homeowner bonus policies, which are 
available to households at or below 80% and 100% MFI. There are significant barriers to 
offering affordable ownership units without monetary subsidies for the developers, including the 
fact that it is difficult to find households at lower income ranges who are mortgage ready and 
looking to own. This is likely a major factor in the low ownership unit production numbers. 
Further, any additional fees to ownership like homeowner association (HOA) fees or required 
maintenance fees at the time of sale are included in the affordability calculation. However, many 
of these ownership units are condos, which tend to have higher turnover rates in HOA 
management. If the HOA management changes after the sale and new higher fees are introduced, 
these will be the responsibility of the homeowner. This puts the risk of potentially very high fees 
on lower-income homeowners, who may not be willing to take that risk. 
 
Unknown costs  
One reason the density bonus method is somewhat popular with the City is the assumption the 
costs for implementing these programs are very low, as the City is not providing a direct subsidy. 
Some housing advocates are skeptical of this argument and point out that while the costs may not 
be obvious, there could still be significant costs in staff time for implementing the program and 
costs for compliance and enforcement. The City has shown interest in introducing some type of 
administrative fee to be paid by developers participating in the bonus, but such a policy has not 
yet been developed. The Fall 2019 draft LDC includes requirements for developers to pay a fee 
based on a “separate ordinance”, but that ordinance does not yet exist. The next chapter of this 
report will attempt to estimate the costs of the density programs. 
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Lack of goals and strategy  
A common conversation around the density bonus programs in Austin is how to set goals for the 
programs when doing so all depends on economic projections that change regularly. The 
unstated goal of the policies is to get as many affordable units as possible from developers, 
however there are no formal numerical goals or qualitative goals for the policy. Though setting 
numerical goals for production of density bonus does not make sense as production is tied to the 
state of the economy, some qualitative goals may help the city better evaluate the success of the 
programs. For example, goals could be set around the percentage of eligible developments that 
participate in a density bonus program. In addition, housing advocates also point out that there 
also does not seem to be a solid strategy for the density bonus programs as a whole; they were all 
adopted separately in a piecemeal fashion over many years and do not have a cohesive direction 
in terms of populations targeted nor target geographies. The density bonus programs were 
adopted by different City Councils over time, causing variation in program design and 
implementation.  
 
Private property managers inexperienced in affordable housing 
An additional cause of concern for some housing advocates is the fact that the density bonus 
units are managed by private property managers who mostly are only experienced in for-profit 
property management. Advocates argue this inexperience can lead to increased noncompliance, 
as the property managers are likely inexperienced in verifying incomes and other reporting 
requirements the City needs to collect for the density bonus units. While technical assistance and 
training is offered by the city, and is generally well-attended, there also tends to be high turnover 
in property management and low incentives for keeping up with optional training. Housing 
advocates have also identified that while property managers may be trained to verify the income 
and meet reporting requirements, the primary motivation for private for-profit property 
management is profit, which can impact how the needs of lower-income residents are treated. If 
residents who belong to a protected class are treated differently than other residents at a property, 
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and this treatment causes a negative impact on protected class residents, this would raise possible 
fair housing violations. 
 
In the Fall 2019 draft LDC, some changes have been made to help address this. While the city 
does not currently have a plan to contract a third-party to manage affordable density bonus units, 
the new code states that a developer participating in a density bonus must use a city-approved 
third party to manage the affordable units. However, there are several exceptions to this 
including: if there are more than three affordable units; if the developer is receiving local, state 
or federal funding for affordable housing; or if the development uses a City operated waitlist that 
has verified income-eligible applicants. It’s also notable that the City currently has no such 
waitlist.  
 
Could require more from developers  
While participation in the density bonus programs is completely voluntary, when developers do 
opt in, they must follow the program requirements to receive the bonus. Due to this, many argue 
that along with the affordable unit set aside or fee requirement, the city can include other 
requirements from developers. Some examples of this include an affirmative marketing plan, a 
source of income discrimination policy so that units would be available to tenants paying part of 
their rent with Housing Choice Vouchers and added tenant protections for density bonus 
residents. However, it should be noted that like all requirements with a voluntary bonus, the costs 
put onto the developer must be outweighed by the benefits they receive.  
 
The City has outlined recommendations for adding some of these into the existing density bonus 
programs. These are outlined in a memo NHCD submitted in March 2019, which is discussed 
below. In addition, the proposed Fall 2019 draft LDC also includes several new stipulations for 
developers participating in density bonus programs, including: requiring an affirmative 
marketing plan that must be approved by the city, disallowing discrimination based on source of 
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income, and ensuring that the bedroom count mix of affordable units offered is similar to the 
bedroom count mix of market-rate units offered. 
 
NHCD Staff Recommendations for Density Bonus  
The City of Austin NHCD staff is aware of many of the issues surrounding the density bonus 
policies, but currently lacks the capacity to respond to all of these issues. Administering the 
density bonus programs is only a small portion of what NHCD staff is responsible for. Currently, 
the equivalent of only two full time employees support density bonus programs.    
 
In March 2019, NHCD staff released a memorandum in response to two City Council directives: 
one directing staff to provide recommendations for changes to the density bonus and fee in lieu 
policies as part of the land code rewrite (Resolution No. 20180823-077) and one directing staff 
to offer recommendations for offering added tenant benefits to units resulting from a density 
bonus (Resolution No. 20180510-050). NHCD staff provided 19 detailed recommendations for 
updating all of the density bonus programs in this memo, which can be found in Appendix B of 






Chapter VII: Analysis of Austin Density Bonus Performance 
 
As discussed in Chapter II, IZ policies like the density bonus are popular because they do not 
require the city to provide a direct monetary subsidy and are generally assumed to be low-cost to 
the city. In Austin, many local housing advocates have questioned these assumptions about the 
outcomes of density bonus programs. Questions arise largely due to the lack of data collected on 
density bonus residents and a lack of comprehensive monitoring. This chapter of the report 
attempts to address those assumptions by offering a cost analysis and analysis of where density 
bonus units are geographically dispersed. This analysis will compare the costs and dispersion of 
density bonus units with other city-subsidized units, and the geographic dispersion of density 
bonus units to other city-subsidized units.  
 
Cost Analysis 
Performing a comprehensive cost analysis on the density programs is difficult given the vast 
ways in which density bonus units might affect the broader economy, causing hidden costs or 
benefits. To complete a more telling cost analysis of density bonus programs, a broader impact 
analysis would need to be completed detailing the changes in land values, rents, and 
development rates. That type of analysis is beyond the scope of this report; instead I offer a 
simplified cost analysis that includes an estimation of costs to the city to implement the density 
bonus programs compared with the costs to create subsidized units to serve households at similar 
median family incomes. Though this analysis is simple, it provides a discussion of some of the 
costs related to implementing these programs. 
 
To complete this analysis, I will compare staff costs of the density bonus programs to staffing 
and subsidy costs of the development assistance programs (AHFC-Subsidized Units). While 
NHCD could not provide an exact amount due to the varied nature of staff responsibilities, 
estimates of the number of full-time employees (FTEs) working on each program and a general 




Table 13 Density Bonus Program Cost Estimates 















Cost Estimate to 
Date 
2 $65,780 $20,391.80 $50,000 $222,343.60 16 $3,557,497.60 
*This is the median male salary for an NHCD employee as reported by the Texas Tribune  
**This rate was taken from BLS estimates for fringe costs to employers   
***This is an estimate of the costs for contracting a third party to monitor DB units  
 
Table 14 Density Bonus Administrative Cost per Unit Estimate 
Density Bonus Cost Per Unit  
# of Units to Date Average Cost per Unit 
1665 $2,136.64 




Table 15 Administrative Cost Estimates for AHFC-Subsidized Units 

















3 $65,780 $20,391.80 $10,569,525.22 $10,828,041 27 $292,357,097 
 
 
Table 16 Administrative Program Cost Estimate per Unit for AHFC-Subsidized Units 
AHFC-Subsidized Costs Per Unit 
# of Units Average Cost per Unit 
8,447 $35,161.64 
 
As shown in the tables above, a rough estimate of administrative costs for implementing the 
density bonus programs, the cost comes out to about $2,100 per affordable unit. When looking at 
the total estimated cost to the city, around $3.5 million, compared to the amount the programs 
have raised in fees in lieu, $10.5 million paid to date, the units appear to offer a higher benefit in 
relation to their costs.  
 
The average city subsidy for a development assistance unit, less staff costs, is around $32,500. It 
is important to note that while this average denotes the subsidy level input by the city, it does not 
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account for the full cost of subsidizing affordable units. Properties that participate in the 
development assistance programs that receive subsidy from the city to produce affordable units 
almost always are also receiving other types of state or federal subsidies or incentives to build 
affordable housing, like the Low-Income Tax Credit. The cost of fully subsidizing an affordable 
housing unit is much greater than $32,500. 
 
When compared with the estimated administrative cost per unit of a subsidized unit produced 
under other programs administered by NHCD, the estimated cost to the city, including staff time, 
is over 1,000% greater for housing development assistance programs. Using the average city 
subsidy cost for development assistance program units, it would have cost the city over $54 
million to subsidize the 1,665 existing density bonus units. Comparing administrative and 
subsidy costs on average, a density bonus unit costs about $2,100 in direct costs to the city, while 
a development assistance unit costs about $34,000.  
 
 






Total Direct Cost to 
City per Unit 
Density Bonus $2,136.64 0 $2,136.64 
Development 
Assistance $1,281.88 $32,533.17 $33,815.05 
 
As noted previously, these are very rough estimates of costs, and do not offer a comprehensive 
look at potentially hidden costs like economic spillovers. This analysis simply provides estimates 
of how much density bonus units cost the city directly in comparison to units produced under 
other programs and addresses some of the concerns often raised about the programs. To 
understand the full costs of the density bonus units, an analysis of how the broader housing 
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economy is affected would need to be done. This analysis should also include a discussion of the 
benefits of density bonus units compared to those produced by other units. For example, it is 
possible that the costs of development could go up due to an IZ program like the density bonus, 
as developers may be shifting the costs of the income restricted units and fees in lieu into higher 
market rate rents. Data would need to be collected on rents across the city, and especially rents in 
neighborhoods with density bonus projects.  
 
Analysis of Geographical Dispersion of Density Bonus Units and AHFC-Subsidized 
This section of the report will include a spatial analysis of density bonus units compared to other 
city subsidized units (through development assistance programs) in relation to Austin’s 
communities of color, census tracts identified as being vulnerable to gentrification, and where 
the units are in relation to income groups. For context, it is important to note that currently, 
density bonus programs are tied to geographic areas, and are only an option in 3% of the city. 
 
The Location of Density Bonus Units and AHFC-Subsidized Units Relative to Austin’s African 
American and Hispanic/Latinx Populations 
One general goal of IZ programs is to reduce concentrating affordable housing in areas that 
already have high rates of concentrated minority populations and poverty. Many argue that 
concentrating affordable housing in areas with high minority populations exacerbates residential 
segregation and limits opportunities for minority populations, who typically over represent lower 
incomes. In looking at the spatial distribution of the current and upcoming density bonus units, 
they perform pretty well in terms of not locating in areas with high concentrations of African 
American and Hispanic/Latinx populations, especially in comparison with AHFC-Subsidized-
subsidized units. The overwhelming majority of density bonus projects are located in census 
tracts where the population is less than 5% African American, and less than 25% Hispanic or 
Latinx. The AHFC-Subsidized-subsidized units, in contrast, are located in areas with higher 
concentrations of African American and Hispanic/Latinx residents, especially for developments 
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that have 100 or more affordable units. It is also important to point out that since we do not have 
demographic information of who is occupying density bonus units, it is impossible to tell if 
residents of color are able to access these units.  
 
It is notable, however, that many of the proposed density bonus projects, displayed as red dots in 
the maps, are in areas with higher concentrations of minority populations. Many of these 
proposed projects are located in far north Austin, where many residents are relocating in hopes of 
cheaper housing costs, and east of I-35 which has historically been characterized by higher rates 
of Austin’s African American and lower-income communities due to racially motivated housing 
and economic development policies. This is noteworthy for two reasons. First, both of these 
areas are subject to gentrification and displacement pressures, as land has typically been cheaper 
in both of these areas. The density bonus projects represent housing projects that are mostly 
market-rate; in this context, it’s possible the increase of proposed density bonus units is 
reflective of further displacement pressures. It’s also noteworthy because, on the other hand, the 
increase in proposed density bonus projects in areas with a higher percent of people of color 
could also represent an affordable option for people to stay in their neighborhoods as 
development pressure continues to grow. Without demographic data on density bonus residents, 
however, it is difficult to understand the effects of having or not having abundant density bonus 
units in neighborhoods with higher rates of people of color. Also, density bonus units would 
need to be offered at rents affordable to households at risk of displacement, and a preference 
policy (which gives priority to people with ties to the neighborhood in accessing income 
restricted units) would need to be implemented in order to offer an option for vulnerable 
residents to stay. 
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Figure 9 Current and Proposed Density Bonus Projects in Relation to Austin’s African American Population 
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Figure 10 Current and Upcoming AHFC-Subsidized-Subsidized Units in Relation to Austin’s African American Population 
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Figure 11 Current and Upcoming Density Bonus Projects in relation to Austin’s Hispanic/Latinx population 
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Figure 12 Current and Upcoming AHFC-Subsidized-Subsidized Units in Relation to Austin’s Hispanic/Latinx Population 
 
63 
Density Bonus Units and AHFC-Subsidized-Subsidized Units Compared to Spatial Distribution 
of Income Groups 
The spatial pattern of income segregation mirrors the pattern of Austin’s distribution of the 
African American and Hispanic/Latinx populations. As the map displays, higher income 
households in Austin are heavily concentrated on the western side of the city. As with the 
distribution of density bonus projects in regard to race, the density bonus projects also perform 
well in terms of avoiding concentrating in areas with lower incomes, especially when compared 
with AHFC-Subsidized units. Similar to the geographic dispersion of AHFC-Subsidized units in 
terms of racial demographics, a larger share of large AHFC-Subsidized units (100 units or more) 
tend to be located in areas with lower incomes. Also similar to the density bonus project 
distribution in terms of racial demographics, is the fact that many proposed density projects are 
in areas with lower incomes. As stated above, this could be representative of changing 
demographics due to gentrification.  
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Figure 13 Current and Upcoming Density Bonus Projects in Relation to Income 
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Figure 14 Current and Upcoming AHFC-Subsidized Units in Relation to Incomes 
 
66 
Density Bonus Units and AHFC-Subsidized units Compared to Census Tracts Identified as 
Vulnerable to Displacement Through Gentrification  
In this part of the analysis, census tracts that have been identified as vulnerable to gentrification 
in the Uprooted report are overlapped with current and upcoming density bonus units and with 
AHFC-Subsidized units. As the map shows, there is a cluster of density bonus projects in the 
vulnerable tract east of downtown and just north of the Colorado River. Most of these projects 
are associated with the TOD density bonus near the Plaza Saltillo station. The concentration of 
units displays the high development pressure of this area; the tract has also been classified as 
“late stage” gentrification, meaning the area has already been gentrified and not much could be 
done to change its course. Given the results of the analysis above, which noted there are more 
AHFC-Subsidized units in areas with higher concentrations of low-incomes and people of color, 
it is not surprising that there are significantly more AHFC-Subsidized units in vulnerable tracts. 
 
Aside from the projects near Plaza Saltillo, there are few density bonus projects located in 
vulnerable tracts. Though offering density bonuses inherently means more market-rate 
development will occur, the density bonus has been discussed as a tool to lower displacement 
pressure in vulnerable areas. However, this may not be an appropriate tool given that higher rents 
are needed to support larger multi-family developments that would be likely to participate in a 
density bonus program (a detailed analysis of how local rents affect density bonus and 
development feasibility is discussed in Chapter VIII). Though affordable housing policy 
generally attempts to avoid concentrations of affordable housing in areas that already have 
concentrations of poverty and minority population, these subsidized units may be a better 
housing option in vulnerable areas than incentivized affordable housing. With AHFC-Subsidized 
units, there are generally more affordable units offered at deeper levels of affordability. Though 
they are more expensive to build, subsidized units may be a better tool in these vulnerable areas 




Figure 15 Density Bonus Units in Tracts Identified as Vulnerable to Displacement through Gentrification 
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To create a holistic cost study of the density bonus projects, more data and analysis would need 
to be completed on possible economic spillover effects (it is possible incentivized development 
could result in higher rents overall). However, given the data that is available, a simplified cost 
analysis can be done to at least compare the cost of administering density bonus units to the cost 
of administering city-subsidized units on a per-unit basis. Doing this analysis with rough 
estimates shows that even with some of the staff costs accounted for, the density bonus units cost 
the city significantly less than the AHFC-Subsidized units. In addition, the fees-in-lieu raised by 
the density bonus projects are larger than the direct cost to the city to implement the program.  
 
Evaluating Austin’s density bonus programs in terms of geographic dispersion yields mixed 
results. While the density bonus projects are less concentrated in areas with concentrations of 
minority populations or high rates of lower incomes than AHFC-Subsidized units, there are still 
no density bonus units west of Mo-Pac or in areas with concentrations of high incomes. In 
addition, without data on who is living in those units it is hard to draw conclusions on whether 
these units are fostering greater racial diversity. When comparing density bonus units with 
AHFC-Subsidized units in terms of tracts considered vulnerable to residential displacement, 
AHFC-Subsidized units are providing much more housing opportunity in these areas. This 
makes sense given the fact that large market-rate developments are less likely to occur in these 




Chapter VIII: Analysis of Density Bonus Under Fall 2019 LDC Draft 
 
As briefly discussed in Chapter IV of this report, Austin is in the process of updating its land 
development code (LDC). The LDC rewrite aims to significantly increase housing capacity in 
the city, as well as income-restricted housing capacity via the density bonus programs. With 
changes to the zoning and new bonus program being introduced, it’s estimated that the density 
bonuses could increase the number of affordable units from the current anticipated production of 
around 1,500 affordable units in ten years to anywhere between 6,607-16,238 affordable units. 
This chapter outlines some of those changes and provides an analysis as to how the LDC rewrite 
might affect density bonus production performance.  
 
Changes to Existing Density Bonus Programs 
The Fall 2019 draft LDC proposes changes to three existing density bonus programs: the 
Downtown Density Bonus program, the VMU program, and the UNO program. For the 
Downtown Density Bonus program, which currently has produced no physical units but over 
$1.3 million in fees-in-lieu, the area for no limits on height and floor-to-area ratios has been 
expanded, as shown in the maps below. For the VMU program, no programmatic changes are 
proposed, but a special designation was developed to preserve properties in the VMU 
designation currently. The properties with the new “-V” designation will be required to set aside 
10% or more of total units for affordable housing at 60% for rental units or 80% MFI for 
ownership units (in accord with current VMU program guidelines, listed in Appendix A). There 
is also no fee in lieu option for the “-V” designation. The -V designation ensures properties 
currently zoned for vertical mixed use will remain so; the affordability requirements for the 
bonus and the incentives remain the same. For the UNO program, the area where higher bonuses 
are offered is expanded.  
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Requirements for all Density Bonus Programs 
Aside from the Downtown Density Bonus and the VMU Development Bonus programs, there 
are no specific programmatic changes for the other existing density bonus programs in the 
proposed LDC. There are, however, additional requirements for participation in any density 
bonus program, some of which were mentioned in Chapter VI of this report. These requirements 
include: 
• An affirmative marketing plan to be approved by the director of NHCD 
• Design standards requiring affordable units to have the same features as market-rate units 
• A prohibition on discrimination based on the tenants’ source of income, including 
housing vouchers 
• A “proportional bedroom count” requirement, which states the mix of bedrooms in 
affordable units must be proportional to those in market-rate units 
• A requirement for participants to use a city-approved third-party manager for affordable 
units, unless the development has more than three income restricted units; is receiving 
other federal, state, or local funding for affordable housing; or if the development uses a 
city-facilitated waitlist to match qualifying residents to income restricted units (this 
waitlist does not exist yet) 
• An administrative fee to be paid by the developer to cover the cost of the city 
implementing the program 
 
Existing density bonus programs and changes to base zoning 
As the production rate of density bonus programs is correlated to the allowable development 
without the bonus, there have been some concerns over how the production of the existing 
density bonus programs may be affected with the proposed Fall 2019 draft LDC. However, it 
seems the base zoning for most areas in existing density bonus programs has not changed 
significantly. For example, many of the existing areas in the density bonus programs have 
specific designations, like TOD or the NBG, which is part of a regulating plan. For UNO, while 
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the base zoning has increased, the UNO overlay remains and offers a very high bonus. For some 
bonus properties, like the one in the S.M.A.R.T. Greenfield program, the existing low-density 
zoning of MF-2 has changed to RM2. The new designation allows for only one more unit per lot 
but includes a bonus for additional height and floor area ratio (FAR) limits.  
 
New density bonus program: AHBP 
To encourage more affordable housing production via the density bonus, the proposed Fall 2019 
draft LDC also includes new density bonus programs. One of these is the proposed Affordable 
Housing Bonus Program (AHBP) that offers a city-wide bonus tied to zoning, unlike the current 
density bonus programs which are tied to specific geographic areas. The current version of the 
AHBP density bonus varies by zoning designations, and the affordable set-aside ranges from 
5%-25% dependent on both zoning and where the development is located within the city. The 
affordable set aside requirement was calibrated based on hyper-local market data by economic 
consultants hired by the City of Austin. The consultants calibrated these amounts based on the 
estimated feasibility of developments with or without a bonus and what it would cost to cover the 
costs of income-restricted units. While many local housing advocates and some City Council 
members have advocated for a minimum of a 10% set aside across the city, this would 
potentially disincentivize developers from participating in the program, and thus would result in 
fewer affordable housing units.  
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New density bonus program: The Equity Bonus 
In response to concerns about residential displacement in gentrifying areas, the Council asked 
staff to propose a density bonus program specific to census tracts identified as vulnerable to 
displacement due to gentrification in the Uprooted study. In an attempt to lower displacement 
pressure, the city Council proposed that these areas should not be “up-zoned”, but instead should 
offer a development incentive to create income-restricted housing. Thus, the Equity Bonus 
program was proposed in February 2020. The Equity Bonus requires a 10% set-aside of units 
that must be built on-site; it does not offer a fee in lieu option. To preserve existing multi-family 
housing in these areas, the program proposes that existing multi-family properties must be 




Figure 20 Areas eligible for Equity Bonus 
 
 
Last, the proposed code also includes the Affordability Unlocked Development Bonus, which the 
Austin City Council adopted in May 2019. Like the citywide bonus program, Affordability 
Unlocked is applied throughout the city to qualifying developments; it is not tied to specific 
geographic location. Affordability Unlocked requires the highest affordable set aside at 50%, and 
in exchange offers a wider variety of zoning incentives and waivers than most other density 
bonus programs in Austin.  This program was designed to target developers who are already 
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building affordable housing; the high set-aside will make it easier for affordable housing 
developers to take advantage of density bonuses and other developer incentives. 
 
Tempering expectations of the density bonus capacity 
These new density bonus programs significantly expand the area in the city eligible for density 
bonuses. With the new programs in place, it is estimated that the capacity for affordable units 
through density bonuses will increase to anywhere between 6,607 to 16,238 units. However, it is 
important to note that these numbers are projections of capacity, the programs remain voluntary 
and still require enough incentive for developers to opt in. To implement a successful density 
bonus program, the city must ensure the balance between incentives and requirements are kept at 
a level that will encourage participation. While new additional requirements and higher and more 
inflexible affordable set-aside rates are aimed at increasing affordable housing production and 
quality, it must be taken into account that these programs are entirely voluntary and stringent 
requirements could discourage participation.  
 
As exemplified in the existing density bonus programs, the programs are highly dependent on the 
balance of incentives, requirements, and hyper-local housing market conditions. Out of the ten 
existing density bonus programs, only six have produced units, and over half of all density bonus 
production is due to one program, the University Neighborhood Overlay. The existing programs 
have a much higher capacity of production than the 1,665 units they have produced. Thus, 
expectations for the new programs’ production rate should be tempered with Austin’s current 
experience in producing density bonus units.  
 
With the Equity Bonus, in exchange for a bonus, there is an affordable set-aside requirement of 
10%, with no in-lieu fee option. With the AHBP, set aside requirements vary based on hyper-
local market trends, but there has been an effort by local policymakers and some affordable 
housing advocates to require a 10% minimum set-aside for this program as well. While these 
minimum set-aside requirements are made with the intention to create more affordable housing, 
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it’s important to consider that the bonus programs are completely voluntary and set-aside 
requirements can deter developers from participating, thus can result in less affordable housing.  
 
One issue with the 10% minimum set aside is that local rents vary based on neighborhood and 
geographic area within the city, and play a large part in what, how much, and where developers 
decide to build. ECONorthwest, the consulting group hired by the City of Austin to help 
calibrate the AHPB bonus and requirements, provided a workbook to show whether taking a 
density bonus with specific requirements would cover the costs of the required income-restricted 
units. The workbook uses development cost assumptions based on Austin developer interviews, 
public feedback, and input from city staff.  The workbook also uses an average city-wide rent of 
$2.75/square foot.  Information in the workbook can be updated to reflect the local market 
conditions and construction costs based on building type.  By using the average rents/square foot 
for specific neighborhoods, we can see how the development feasibility and bonus feasibility 
changes when the rent is lower than the city average of $2.75, as the cost of land  and the amount 
of rent that can be charged  will vary in different parts of the city. If the existing average 
neighborhood rent is too low to support a bonus option or a feasible multi-family development, 
developers will either choose to locate elsewhere or raise the rents. Other development costs, like 
construction, do not typically vary with location within the city. This is specifically important for 
the Equity Bonus, as the areas identified as vulnerable to displacement typically have lower rents 
than the rest of the city.  
 
To observe how the feasibility can change with rents, I developed an average rent/square foot for 
three neighborhoods identified as vulnerable in the Uprooted study: St. Johns, classified as “most 
vulnerable”; Highland North, classified as “more vulnerable”; the Holly neighborhood located 
near East Cesar Chavez, classified as “vulnerable”. All three are located in areas qualifying for 
the Equity Bonus. To calculate the average rents for the neighborhoods, I used Zillow to identify 
five multifamily properties in each neighborhood and then used the average rent/square foot. The 




Table 18 Average rents for St. Johns, Highland North, and Holly Neighborhoods 
Neighborhood Vulnerability Class Average Rent/Square Foot 
St. John’s Most Vulnerable $1.76 
Highland North More Vulnerable $1.92 
Holly Vulnerable $2.23 
 
The exemplary development scenario in the workbook compares a development with base 
entitlements for a 3-story residential rental building with 97 units, and a bonus development 
scenario which increases the base development to 5 stories, 196 units, and a higher floor to area 
ratio. The development scenario feasibility does not take into account the amount required to 
subsidize the affordable units; it only determines if that size of development would be profitable. 
In a separate tab, the amount required to subsidize the affordable units is calculated based on the 
set-aside requirement. Using neighborhood specific rents, the feasibility of the development 
scenario listed in the workbook changes for each rent level. In addition to changing the 
rent/square foot value, I also updated the median family income to reflect the 2019 values set by 
HUD; all other assumptions from this model remained. 
 
When using the average rent of $1.76, the value in St. John’s neighborhood, the base 
development scenario (without the bonus) became not feasible; thus, the bonus scenario is also 
not feasible. When using the Highland North average rent of $1.92/square foot, the base scenario 
is feasible, but the bonus is not. The same result is found when the Holly neighborhood rent of 
$2.23/square foot is used; the base development is feasible, but the bonus scenario is not. I found 
the same results for each neighborhood when lowering the number of stories and units in both 
scenarios. To clarify the meaning of these results, the feasibility status is determining the 
profitability of the development based on its size and the rent it will generate; it does not even 
account for the amount needed to subsidize the affordable units.  
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Of course, this analysis is not exact, and in reality, many of the assumptions built into this pro-
forma would change based on the developer and the exact location of the development. 
However, it does show how hyper-local rents inform how and where developers build and 
exemplifies why “one size fits all” affordability set-asides associated with density bonus could 
actually deter developers from participating in the programs. This analysis also exemplifies how 
and why developers would likely increase rents in this type of development, which is antithetical 
to Equity Bonus’s goal of creating more affordable housing options in vulnerable areas. In 
addition, it also shows how a density bonus program may not be an effective tool to produce 
affordable units in every neighborhood in the city. According to this simplified analysis, 
developers building rental housing in these neighborhoods may be unlikely to participate in a 
density bonus program at all, as the rents are not high enough to support the costs of developing 
a bigger building. If they do decide to participate, it is likely because they are charging rents 
much higher than the neighborhood’s existing average, which would be a sign of accelerated 
gentrification.  
 
Other Regulations Influence Development  
In developing expectations of housing production related to zoning changes and density bonus 
programs, it is important to consider that while the density allowable by zoning is certainly 
correlated to housing production, it is not the only factor that comes into play in determining the 
size and density of housing developments. A wide body of research shows that developers are 
influenced by requirements like lot sizes, parking, and costs of capital in determining what they 
will build. The economic concept of diminishing returns of capital explains why developers may 
not choose to build the highest or largest building allowable; as you build more, the costs of 
capital can become disproportional to the value of the building. For example, building a taller 
development may require an elevator that was not needed before, or may require the use of more 
expensive framing to support a higher weight burden. Other regulations affecting costs and 
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feasibility analyses to developers must also be considered when calculating expectations for 
density bonus success.  
 
Parking requirements also heavily determine the feasibility of developments, as developers must 
weigh the value of additional units with the costs of additional parking infrastructure. This is 
reflected in the AHBP workbook; the workbook assumes the parking requirement is one stall per 
housing unit, and according to feedback from developers, city staff, and public input, the 
workbook estimates the following parking costs for developments in Austin: 
 
 
Table 19 Parking Costs for Developments in Austin outlined by the Affordable Housing Bonus Program Workbook 
Surface parking ($/stall) $7,000 
Wrapped deck parking ($/stall) $22,000 
Integrated deck ($/stall) $33,000 
Podium parking ($/stall) $30,000 
Underground/Tuck under/Pit-Stacker parking ($/stall) $40,000 
 
The diminishing returns of capital are clearly observed here; the more units you build, more 
parking will be required, and the price difference between surface parking to more advanced 
parking more than triples. The workbook can also be used to test different scenarios with 
differing parking infrastructure. For example, in the exemplary base scenario described earlier, 
the development offers 97 units and thus 97 parking stalls. In the bonus scenario, 196 units are 
built; thus 196 parking stalls must also be offered. The base scenario includes the parking stalls 
in a surface lot, and the bonus scenario offers 76 stalls in a surface lot, and the remaining 120 in 
a podium style parking structure. While both of these scenarios are feasible in terms of 
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profitability, the additional parking costs in the bonus scenario would allow for about 5% of the 
total units to be affordable at 60% MFI.  
 
Like the analysis with changing rents discussed earlier in this chapter these scenarios are based 
on a broad set of assumptions that could change in several ways when put in the real world. The 
parking infrastructure chosen by developers is heavily dependent on their budgets, availability of 
land, and requirements set by the city. However, using the AHPB workbook to test different 
parking scenarios is telling of how parking costs can influence a development, and exemplifies 
how factors besides zoning determine what is built. This denotes that reduced parking 







Chapter IX: Findings from Peer Cities  
 
In addition to analysis on the Austin Density Bonus programs, I also interviewed housing 
department staff in several peer cities with established density bonus programs. The purpose of 
these interviews was to identify potential best practices or program design methods to improve 
the Austin density bonus programs, in particular ideas for addressing some of the common 
criticisms outlined in Chapter VI. However, as discussed in the literature review, comparing IZ 
program design and IZ program success across municipalities is difficult and nuanced. The 
success of the IZ programs is highly determined by local housing market conditions and local 
politics.  
 
Initially, I began this research with cities in states where IZ is also preempted by the state. I 
spoke with staff in Dallas, Charlotte, Madison, and Nashville, and while each city had a version 
of IZ in the past or had recently passed an IZ ordinance, none of these cities had a robust 
program producing a meaningful amount of housing units. After finding limited information 
from cities in preempted states, I interviewed larger cities with well-known IZ policies. These 
include Portland, Boston, San Jose, Seattle, Denver and Montgomery County, Maryland. As 
these cities offer a mix of voluntary and mandatory programs, comparing program design to 
Austin is not easy. Additionally, I was able to speak with staff from the Grounded Solutions 
Network, who facilitate Inclusionaryhousing.org, and are a leading institution in IZ policy 
research.  
 
The focus of these interviews was how/if these cities are collecting data on their IZ residents, 
management of IZ units, and other program design elements. The purpose of these questions was 
to apply any helpful lessons to some of the common criticisms of Austin’s density bonus 
programs. Some key findings from these interviews are outlined below. 
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Data Collection and Management 
Only Boston is attempting to collect race/ethnicity data on IZ residents, and has only just begun 
doing so, so there’s no data to report yet. There is no clear plan of how the City plans to use that 
data, other than knowing and reporting who is living in IZ units. Other cities expressed concern 
over collecting demographic data other than income and family size, as individual property 
managers would be collecting this, and, similarly to Austin, property managers expressed 
concerns over fair housing. Fair housing laws make it illegal to discriminate against protected 
classes, so demographic information cannot be used in the decision to rent an apartment. 
However, if this data were collected after the unit were leased, it should not raise fair housing 
concerns.  In addition, while Denver is in the process of developing a web-based tool, none of 
these cities are using a web-based platform to collect data/forms/applications from developer 
applications and/or resident applications; instead, staff collect this data directly. 
 
Partnerships with mission-driven organizations to achieve deeper affordability 
Montgomery County utilizes robust partnerships with their public housing authority to buy down 
the units. As a result of their partnership model, 1/3 of all IZ units are provided to either 
vulnerable populations and/or are offered at much deeper affordability. Montgomery County also 
shares implementation with another department, the Department of Housing and Community 
Affairs (DHCA). 
 
Partnerships with other city departments to match residents to IZ units 
While several cities expressed interest in developing or cited current efforts to develop a waitlist, 
Montgomery County is also the only municipality I interviewed that offers a waitlist, which is 
facilitated by the DHCA. In Boston, the Boston Planning and Development Agency (BPDA) 
implements the IZ program, and partners with the Office of Fair Housing to facilitate a 
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preference policy for existing neighborhood residents to receive priority for IZ units and a lottery 
system to match residents to IZ units.  
 
Third-party management of IZ units 
None of the cities I spoke with are using a third party to manage the units, but many expressed 
interests in doing so. Funding and capacity were often mentioned as roadblocks to using this 
model. 
 
Austin is a top-performing city in completely voluntary IZ programs 
In my interview with staff from Grounded Solutions, I inquired about other completely voluntary 
programs in cities that have comparable production rates to Austin; the answer: there aren’t any. 
Grounded Solutions informed me that when other cities who are attempting to implement a 
voluntary IZ program inquire about best practices or exemplary cities, Austin is used as a 
reference. The staff mentioned how difficult it can be to implement a successful program that is 
completely voluntary and noted they typically do not advise cities to rely on voluntary IZ 
programs to produce a large amount of affordable housing.  
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Chapter X: Recommendations and Conclusion 
 
Consistent with IZ literature discussed previously in this report, evaluating the success of an IZ 
policy is highly nuanced. The success of an IZ program, like the density bonuses, is dependent 
on housing market conditions and localized policies that vary not only between cities but within 
them. For example, we see a wide variety in production rates of individual density programs 
within the City of Austin, due in large part to the varied nature of land values and housing 
demand in different localities in the city and the variety of incentives offered between the 
programs. This makes it difficult to evaluate density bonus programs in comparison with not 
only other cities’ programs, but also with each other in the same city.  
 
The nuanced nature of evaluating density bonus programs also makes it difficult to offer specific 
recommendations for guaranteed, likely, or increased success of the density bonus tool for 
creating affordable housing. However, the analysis of Austin’s density bonus programs outlined 
in this report, which analyzed Austin’s current density bonus program’s production rates, costs, 
spatial distribution, and common criticisms provides key takeaways that can inform program 
design and future implementation of new density bonus programs. These take-aways are outlined 
below.  
 
The costs of administering density bonus programs are low, but the costs would rise to address 
some of the monitoring and enforcement concerns. A common criticism of Austin’s density 
bonus programs is that there could be hidden costs associated with administering the programs. 
While it is true that these programs do not come “for free” to the city, the production of density 
bonus affordable units comes at a very low direct cost to the city, especially when the fees in lieu 
and the amount of subsidy that would have otherwise been required are accounted for. However, 
if the City were to address some of the concerns about limited monitoring and enforcement, costs 
for administering the programs would rise.  
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The direct cost for producing density bonus units is very low, especially compared to other city 
programs to produce income restricted housing units. In comparing administrative and subsidy 
costs of administering the density bonus programs and the development assistance programs; the 
density bonus costs only an estimated $2,000 in direct costs to the city while AHFC-Subsidized 
units cost an estimated $34,000 to the city. While these costs could go up if the city addresses 
some of the monitoring and administration issues, the direct costs associated with density bonus 
units will still be much lower than providing a subsidy.  
 
To account for the full costs and benefits of the density bonus programs, a more 
comprehensive analysis should be done on how the programs perform in terms of meeting 
affordable housing goals related to vulnerable populations. This report has discussed the low 
costs of administering density bonus programs, but to fully understand the benefits of the density 
bonus units, it is important to know how they are performing in meeting the city’s affordable 
housing goals related to housing vulnerable residents. Comparing density bonus units to other 
city-subsidized units, it is notable that density bonus programs are more successful in offering 
housing options in areas with higher incomes and without existing concentrations of minority 
populations. However, without demographic data, it is difficult to understand how density bonus 
units are or are not meeting the needs of Austin residents.  
 
Given low production of ownership bonus units and high rates of renters in Austin, it makes 
sense to eliminate ownership density bonus efforts and focus on rental units. Ownership 
density bonus unit production accounts for only 2% of the total production; this accounts for 
only 13 affordable ownership units over a span of 13 years. This low rate is likely due to barriers 
in finding eligible low-income residents who are pursuing home ownership. Given that Austin’s 
housing market is made up of 54% renters, and that most low-income households are looking for 
rental options, it makes sense to focus density bonus programs on rental units. 
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Demographic data collection on residents could help better inform the city’s strategy for using 
the density bonus and for evaluating the success of the density bonus programs. Currently, the 
city is not collecting demographic data on residents, but it is doing so for other subsidized units. 
As such, the density bonus programs are operating “race blind”. The lack of data disallows the 
City to understand what populations do or do not have access to these units, the role a density 
bonus program might play in residential displacement and makes it difficult to comprehensively 
evaluate the success of the density bonus programs in creating more diverse communities. 
Demographic data would also let the City know if and how the density bonus units can address 
the needs of different populations, like families with children, the elderly, or people with 
disabilities. Data on race/ethnicity would denote if Austin’s communities of color are able to 
access density bonus units. Data on where density bonus units work would denote if density 
bonus units help reduce transit times and offer an option for residents to live closer to their jobs, 
or closer to more opportunities for jobs. Data on resident’s age would inform the city of what age 
groups have access to density bonus units, and if families with children are able to access these 
units. Information on where density bonus residents have lived in the past could also help inform 
potential preference policies, which could prioritize existing or past residents of the 
neighborhood for any bonus units that are developed in the neighborhood.  
 
The proposed Equity Bonus is not an appropriate tool for producing affordable housing in 
areas vulnerable to displacement from gentrification. As the literature review discussed, 
housing production through IZ programs like the density bonus are highly dependent on hyper-
local housing market conditions. In addition, as the rent analysis in Chapter VIII of this report 
showed, the size and type of developments that occur are highly depending on local rents; i.e. the 
cost of land. Most areas identified as vulnerable to displacement from gentrification in Austin 
have lower rents; developments that would participate in this bonus would need to have rents 
much higher than the area’s average, which is antithetical to the program’s goal of offering more 
affordable housing options. This type of new, more expensive development in areas vulnerable 
to displacement would be a sign of furthered gentrification, not a tool to combat residential 
displacement.  Encouraging developments with The Equity Bonus, which requires a 10% 
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affordable unit set-aside, will be unlikely to produce many income restricted units in these 
vulnerable areas.  
 
Regulations other than zoning, like parking requirements, should be considered in developing 
expectations for density bonus unit production and in developing incentives. The Fall 2019 
draft LDC offers that the potential density bonus capacity could increase from its current level to 
between 6,607 to 16,238 units. While expanding the density bonus programs is a positive thing, 
and will likely increase affordable housing production, the expectations for production should be 
tempered with other factors affecting the success of density bonus production. From the current 
programs, we know that overall production will likely be much lower than the program’s 
capacity. Additionally, several other regulations including parking requirements, and the fact that 
bigger buildings are generally more expensive will impact developer’s decision to participate in 
a bonus program. Reducing parking requirements could be a successful incentive. 
 
Overall, the density bonus program is a valuable tool for creating affordable housing units in 
Austin. While the density bonus unit production contributes a small amount to the overall 
housing stock in the city, these 1,665 units have provided housing options to thousands of 
residents in need of an affordable housing option. While the programs often receive criticism, the 
City has made efforts to address many of these issues in the proposed Fall 2019 draft LDC. 
While density bonus production has been much lower than city-subsidized units, the density 
bonus units outperform the AHFC-Subsidized units in terms of offering an affordable housing 
option in areas with higher incomes and that do not have existing concentrations of minority 
populations. This report has outlined that while the density bonus program alone cannot solve the 
affordability crisis in Austin, it remains a valuable and cost-effective tool in the toolbox of 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix B: Memo outlining NHCD staff recommendation for density bonus programs 
 
 This memorandum and attached recommendations are provided in response to Resolution No. 
20180823-077 which directed staff 1) to develop recommendations for code and regulating plan 
amendments needed to recalibrate density bonus policy affordability and fee-in-lieu requirements; and 
2) to return to Council with recommendations and options that encourage on-site affordability and 
consider risks of diminishing the number of affordable units and fees-in-lieu. It also responds to 
Resolution No. 20180510-050 which initiated code amendments and amendments to uncodified 
ordinances to prohibit source of income discrimination in all units, and require good cause eviction 
protections in rent-restricted units or all units in properties that participate in City density bonus or 
other similar incentive programs.  
 
Resolution No. 20180823-077  
The City of Austin has 12 different density bonus policies, each adopted independently between 2004 
and 2010. Given the dynamics of housing submarkets change over time, and many affordability 
requirements in these policies have not been comprehensively re-evaluated since their adoption, staff 
recognizes this as an opportunity to not only recalibrate the City’s density bonus policies, but also to 
offer recommendations for policy updates. To that end, the goal of the attached staff recommendations 
is to update Austin’s density bonus policies to generate the greatest number of on-site affordable 
housing units (in developments with residential uses) and to maximize the fees in lieu of affordable units 
(in developments without residential uses).  
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The modeling completed for existing density bonus policies as part of CodeNEXT is not sufficient 
because it considered only changing fees, not reassessing the percentage of units required as called for 
by this resolution. Therefore, economic modeling will be necessary to assess and recommend affordable 
unit set-aside requirements, fee levels, and development entitlements for existing density bonus 
programs. Other staff recommendations described in the attachment include allowing administrative 
approvals of fees in lieu of affordable units in certain circumstances, instituting fees for non-residential 
projects participating in density bonus programs, and inserting proportionate unit mix requirements and 
source of income protections into all density bonus policies. Also included is a recommendation to 
increase enforcement mechanisms for the policies. Staff suggests these recommendations, and the 






Resolution No. 20180510-050  
As stated above and on page 5 of the attachment, staff recommends the inclusion of source of income 
protections and good cause eviction protections in density bonus units be considered during this 
recalibration and code amendment process.  
Under the Austin Strategic Housing Blueprint Implementation one- to two-year work plan, the City’s 
other affordable housing incentive program, S.M.A.R.T. Housing, will be updated and enhanced. Staff 
recommends this update process consider the source of income and good cause eviction protections for 
S.M.A.R.T. Housing.  
Next Steps  
Staff will await Council direction to initiate the code amendment process to update the density bonus 
policies, should Council decide to move forward with these recommendations. With that direction, staff 
will obtain a consultant through a competitive solicitation to undertake the necessary recalibration and 
economic modeling.  
 
If you have questions, please contact Rosie Truelove, Director, at (512) 974-3064 or 
rosie.truelove@austintexas.gov; or Erica Leak, Acting Assistant Director, at (512) 974-9375 or 
erica.leak@austintexas.gov.  
 
cc: Spencer Cronk, City Manager J. Rodney Gonzales, Assistant City Manager Greg Guernsey, Director, 
Planning and Zoning Department 
Background  
The City of Austin has 12 different density bonus policies each adopted independently between 2004 
and 2010. The policiesAustin Strategic Housing Blueprint. 1 are voluntary development incentives tied to 
base zoning or overlay districts, each varying in allowable development entitlements and required 
community benefits, with most only available in specific parts of the city. Since inception, these policies 
have created 1,459 dwelling units affordable to households earning no more than 50, 60, 80, or 100 
percent of the area median family income (depending on the policy used), without the use of any public 
subsidy. It is estimated that the cost to buy down these units from market rates to the affordable rates 
would be greater than $75 million. Additionally, these policies have generated $4,584,734 in fee-in-lieu 
revenue used to subsidize the provision of housing and services to persons experiencing chronic 
homelessness and the development of very low income housing. Perhaps most noteworthy is that the 
overwhelming majority of these affordable units are located in mixed income, high opportunity 
communities with good access to public transit, addressing several goals identified in Imagine Austin, 
Strategic Direction 2023, and the  
1 This memo refers to both density bonus policies, which are regulations that reside in the City Land 
Development Code and Regulating Plans and are set by ordinance, and density bonus programs, 
meaning the implementation of the density bonus regulations.  
Resolution No. 20180823-077 directed staff to 1) develop recommendations for code and regulating 
plan amendments needed to recalibrate density bonus policy affordability and fee-in-lieu requirements, 
and 2) to bring back to Council recommendations and options that encourage on-site affordability and 
consider risks of diminishing the number of affordable units and fees-in-lieu. Given that the dynamics of 
housing submarkets change over time, and that many of the affordability requirements in these policies 
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have not been comprehensively re-evaluated since their adoption, staff recognize this as an opportunity 
not only to recalibrate the City’s density bonus policies, but also to offer recommendations for policy 
updates. These recommendations are listed in the table on the next page.  
 
Staff Recommendations  
NHCD’s central goal in providing these recommendations is to update Austin’s density bonus policies 
to generate the greatest number of on-site affordable housing units (in developments with residential 
uses) and to maximize the fees in lieu of affordable units (in developments with non-residential uses).  
While maximizing the number of affordable units built and fees collected is the central goal, staff 
recognize that there are many other competing goals and priorities in the community. As directed in 
Resolution No. 20180823-077, staff have sought to incorporate these other policy goals where feasible 
and have noted where enforcement of these goals may diminish participation and unit yield.  
 
Consultant for Economic Modeling & Recalibration  
Should Council initiate code amendments based on these recommendations, staff will obtain a 
consultant through a competitive solicitation process to evaluate and recalibrate the affordable unit set-
aside requirements, fee levels, and development entitlements for existing density bonus programs. The 
modeling will take into account various levels of affordability (income levels and numbers of affordable  
units) to assess impacts to production of units. The modeling completed for existing density bonus 
policies as part of CodeNEXT is not sufficient because it considered only changing fees, not reassessing 
percentages of affordable units required as called for by this resolution. Changing market conditions and 
the lack of a comprehensive review of existing policies’ performance necessitate recalibration. Modeling 
unit production at different income levels and numbers of affordable units will help the City understand 
the trade-offs between height, density, deeper levels of affordability, and numbers of units.  
 
Other Recommendations  
The table below describes other staff recommendations, including allowing administrative approvals of 
fees in lieu of affordable units in certain circumstances, instituting fees for non-residential projects 
participating in density bonus programs, and inserting proportionate unit mix requirements and source 
of income protections into all density bonus policies. Staff recommend that these proposals, and the 









Recommendation  Justification  
All  Update the affordable unit set-asides 
and affordable housing fee rates in all 
policies to reflect the results of the 
new recalibration, and move 
affordable housing fee rates from 
Updating the set-aside and 
fee requirements will 
implement the findings of the 
new economic modeling and 
recalibration. As suggested in 
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disparate ordinances and land 
development code sections to the 
City’s Fee Schedule.  
Resolution 20180823-077, 
moving fee rates from many 
different ordinances into the 
City’s Fee Schedule will allow 
Council to annually approve 
the fees with the city budget 
and will provide for annual 
review and updates as 
necessary.  
All  Standardize the basis of affordability 
requirements across all policies (i.e., 
total units, bonus units, bonus area, 
and net rentable area).  
Currently, some policies 
require a percentage of units 
to be affordable, while some 
require a percentage of square 
footage (and define square 
footage in different ways, 
habitable versus total, for 
example).  
Standardization across 
policies will make 
administration and 
implementation easier and 
will make requirements 
clearer for developers and 
community members.  
All  Define terms and address 
discrepancies in existing code or 
regulating plan language.  
For transparency and ease of 
use/ administration, clean up 
language in all policies where 
it lacks clarity (this does not 
alter the original 
requirements of the policies, 
it merely clarifies confusing 
language where needed).  
Density Bonus Policy*  Recommendation  Justification  
All  Strengthen compliance and 
enforcement mechanisms in 
policies and program rules. 
Add affirmative marketing 
plan requirements for 
affordable units.  
For transparency, clarity of 
enforcement process, and 
ease of use/ administration, 
provide more information in 
policies and program rules on 
enforcement mechanisms and 
requirements. As in the 
CodeNEXT draft, add 
requirements for affirmative 
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UNO (has hotel only)  
Add an affordable housing fee 
requirement for non-
residential development 
where it does not exist today.  
These policies do not currently 
have fee rates for non-
residential development, 
although non-residential 
projects can access a bonus. 
The City has likely foregone 
revenue due to this omission, 
and will likely continue to do 
so if a non-residential fee is 
not adopted.  
Micro Unit;  
Rainey;  
S.M.A.R.T. SF & MF Density 
Bonus;  
VMU  
Add a requirement that allows 
the Housing Director to 
approve payment of a fee in 
lieu of on-site units for 
residential projects where it 
does not exist today. Establish 
decision making criteria to 
guide the Housing Director in 
making that determination.  
Requiring Council approval of 
fees in lieu of on-site units 
adds significant costs, time, 
and uncertainty to the 
development process. This can 
negatively impact participation 
in the density bonus program 
as developers seek to avoid 
that increased cost and 
uncertainty. Setting fees that 
are commensurate with (or 
higher than) the cost to 
provide units on-site, 
combined with clear policy 
requirements informed by 
community input, will create a 
policy framework that is 
depoliticized, where on-site 
units are prioritized and fees 
are allowed only in cases that 
meet the policy criteria. For 
example, the in lieu fee 
amount could be set at 120% 
the cost of creating an 
affordable unit in the census 
tract of the development.  
TOD  Change the requirement that 
Council must approve 
payment of a fee for non-
residential development, by 
Projects that have no 
residential component cannot 
provide affordable units on-
site. Allowing an 
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allowing the Housing Director 
to approve the fee payment 
instead.  
administrative approval of the 
fee payment makes the 
process clearer, fairer, and 





restrictions on the use of fee-
in-lieu revenue  
Some policies stipulate that 
fees collected through the 
density bonus program can 
only be spent within a 
specified radius of the density 
bonus district. This 
requirement limits the City’s  
ability to layer funding into 
affordable housing 
developments in a timely 
manner, even in developments 
that are serving vulnerable 
populations or are in 
gentrifying or high opportunity 
areas.  
 
All (unit mix already required 
in DDB & Rainey)  
Add the requirement that 
property owners provide 
affordable multi-bedroom 
units proportional to the 
ratio of the multi-bedroom 
units in the overall 
development. Add an option 
to allow property owners to 
provide a 2- or 3-bedroom 
unit in lieu of two or three 1-
bedroom/efficiency units.  
While this requirement 
increases the cost to 
participate in a density bonus 
program and can 
disincentivize participation, 
the community and Council 
have identified the need for 
more affordable units that 
can serve multiple-person 
households. The option to 
provide fewer units if more 
bedrooms are provided is an 
attempt to balance the cost 
to provide multiple bedroom 
units with the need to ensure 
that the bonus policy remains 
attractive to participants. 
This was a recommendation 
proposed under CodeNEXT.  
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All  Add the requirements that 
affordable units shall be of 
like quality to the market 
rate units and shall be 
dispersed throughout the 
development.  
The citywide Affordable 
Housing Bonus Program 
proposed under CodeNEXT 
included requirements for 
comparable quality and unit 
dispersion, drawing on 
density bonus policies in 
other cities. Comparable 
quality and unit dispersion 
requirements help ensure 
fair and equitable housing 
opportunities for the 
residents of affordable units.  
All (already exists in DDB & 
Rainey)  
Add the requirement that 
property owners accept the 
use of rental vouchers in the 
affordable rental units to all 
policies where it does not 
currently exist.  
Although state law prohibits 
municipalities from requiring 
property owners to accept 
Housing Choice Vouchers, 
cities can incentivize 
acceptance of vouchers 
through bonus policies. Staff 
recommends that density 
bonus policies require that 
vouchers be accepted for the 
income-restricted affordable 
units created through density 
bonus programs.  
The recommendation that 
the requirement to accept 
vouchers apply only to 
affordable units is an attempt 
to balance the need for an 
effective voluntary program 
with the costs to participate. 
Because of the way the 
Housing Authority of the City 
of Austin (HACA) sets its 
payment standard (i.e., the 
maximum amount they will 
pay through  
a voucher), rents on market-
rate units in most density 
bonus buildings would still be 
out of reach for voucher 
holders.  
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Staff have received direction 
from Council (via Resolution 
No. 20180510-050) to require 
good cause tenant protections 
in density bonus units. 
Inserting these protections 
into a voluntary policy 
without damaging its ability 
to attract participants will 
require robust bonus 
entitlements and incentives. 
This can be analyzed as part 
of the recalibration process, 
but will mostly likely result in 
decreased participation in 
density bonus programs.  
TOD  Streamline and condense 
Transit-Oriented 
Development density bonus 
affordability requirements 
into a single tier.  
For transparency and ease of 
use/ administration, the 
different density bonus tiers 
in TOD regulating plans 
should be streamlined. The 
current structure is 
ambiguous and financially 
unviable. As of January 2019, 
no projects have been 
completed that have 
complied with both tiers of 
requirements.  
All (except Micro-Unit; VMU)  Add an incentive reducing 
minimum parking 
requirements in density 
bonus policies where it does 
not exist today.  
Parking requirements can be 
a barrier to providing housing 
in terms of cost and taking up 
usable space. To build a 
marketable development, 
developers and their 
investors have an incentive 
to provide parking necessary 
to meet demand. But they 
should be able to explore 
innovative methods of 
meeting that demand. VMU 
allows for a 40% reduction in 
required parking; Micro-Unit 
bonus allows a 75% 
reduction. Other policies can 
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be updated to add parking 
reductions as an incentive.  
TOD  Update income limits for 
affordable ownership units in 
TODs to a level where it is 
more likely for a household 
to qualify for a mortgage.  
Currently, the MLK TOD and 
Plaza Saltillo TOD policies 
require ownership units to be 
available to households at 
60% MFI in certain 
circumstances. This MFI level 
is too low for most 
households to be able to 
obtain a mortgage. Thus, 
even if these units were built 
(which would require 
substantial additional 
subsidy), it would be difficult 
to identify households at 60% 
MFI who would qualify for 
mortgages to purchase the 
units. 
NBG;  
Micro-Unit; S.M.A.R.T. SF & 
MF Density Bonus;  
VMU  
Add an incentive waiving or 
modifying compatibility 
requirements (Land 
Development Code, Chapter 
25-2, Subchapter C, Article 
10) for projects with on-site 
affordable housing in policies 
where it does not exist today.  
Compatibility requirements 
can be a significant barrier 
that makes projects 
infeasible on some sites. 
When projects are providing 
affordable housing units on-
site, waivers of compatibility 
requirements should be 
considered, especially in 
areas identified for dense 
development. This would 
greatly enhance the 
attractiveness of 
participating in the density 
bonus program.  
ERC;  
TOD;  
Expand waivers of 
compatibility requirements 
for projects with on-site 
affordable housing in policies 
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requirements should be 
considered, especially in 
areas identified for dense 
development. This would 
greatly enhance the 
attractiveness of 
participating in the density 
bonus program.  
TOD;  
VMU  
Through the economic 
modeling process, consider 
increasing the maximum 
allowable height with a 
density bonus to 85 feet in 
the Vertical Mixed Use and 
Transit Oriented 
Development zoning districts, 
where appropriate.  
This increase in allowable 
height for projects 
participating in the program 
would enhance the 
attractiveness of the bonus 
policy and increase 
participation by allowing the 
most profitable building 
typology (where market rents 
support it) of 5-story wood 
frame over 2-story podium. 
Focusing on TOD and VMU 
policies would ensure that 
these buildings are only 
allowed in areas that are 
already identified as 
appropriate for denser 
development.  
VMU  Change the current 
requirement to provide retail 
space in VMU buildings to a 
requirement to provide 
occupied space built to 
commercial standards but 
not required to be used for 
commercial purposes. This 
would allow for changes in 
demand for commercial 
space over time.  
VMU properties are 
struggling to find retail 
tenants for their ground floor 
spaces. This recommendation 
proposes a more flexible 
policy that would promote a 
better use of the building and 
ensure more eyes on the 
street. Occupied space could 
include leasing offices, 
amenities (like gyms), small 
groceries, or retail space. 
Building the space to 
commercial standards would 
allow it to be used for 
commercial purposes when 
available.  
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*Density Bonus Policy Key: DDB = Downtown Density Bonus S.M.A.R.T. SF & MF Density Bonus = 
S.M.A.R.T. Single ERC = East Riverside Corridor Family Bonus and Multifamily Greenfield Bonus NBG 
= North Burnet Gateway UNO = University Neighborhood Overlay TOD = Transit-Oriented 









S.M.A.R.T. SF & MF Density 
Bonus  
For the Single Family Bonus: 
Remove minimum 3-acre 
threshold that a project has 
to meet to take advantage of 
the bonus.  
For the Multifamily 
Greenfield Bonus: allow the 
bonus to be used on infill lots 
that have been previously 
developed.  
The S.M.A.R.T. SF & MF 
Density Bonuses allow 
S.M.A.R.T. Housing-certified 
projects to take advantage of 
a higher density zoning 
district in certain cases, 
enabling the developments 
to include a greater number 
of affordable units. Removing 
these restrictions would 
allow these bonuses to be 
utilized in more 
circumstances, promoting 
geographic dispersion of 
affordable units throughout 
high opportunity and 
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